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INTRODUCTION
I.

Social Setting for Guaranteed Wage Plans
The very word "guarantee" connotes insecurity, and a

natural desire to provide for a condition of limited opportunity.

No guarantee is more basic to earth's children than

food, clothing, and shelter.

Necessarily tied to the acquisi-

tion of these basic human staples is the means by which they
are to be attained.
Although medicine, transportation, communication, and
production have made man more optimistic over future prosperity, the workers of even such a productive nation as the
United States are pessimistic of future economic security.
One eminent author's analysis of this insecurity complex of
workers is stated in the following words:
The scarcity consciousness of the manualist is a product
of two main causes, one lying in himself and the other
outside. The typical manualist is aware of his lack of
native capacity for availing himself of economic opportunities as they lie amidst the complex and ever shifting situations of modern business. He knows himself
neither for a born taker of risks nor for the possessor
of a sufficiently agile mind ever to feel at home in the
midst of the uncertain game of competitive business.
Added to this is his conviction that for him the world
has been rendered one of scarcity by an institutional
order ot things, which purposely reserved the best
opportunities for landlords, capitalists, and other
1
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privileged persons. 1
It is impossible to overemphasize the laboring masses'
search for a guarantee against economic insecurity.

In the

face of a foe armed with the seemingly invincible offensive
weapons of money, political power, and education the American
labor movement pursued its struggle for human recognition
relentlessly.

American union-aspirations centered around

economic security as opposed to the heavy political emphaSis
characteristic of the European labor organizations.
With the ultimate ascent of Gomperian voluntarism the
American labor movement could concentrate on the attainment
of its end. 2 The AF of L's attempt at union organ1zation suffered many set-backs from 1900 to 1932 on the legislative,
judicial, and economic fronts, but the lessons were vivid
enough to afford valuable experienoe for such a young and
dynamic social institution.
Two important factors 1n the 1930's removed the last
impediments to freedom and growth ot the American labor movelSelig Perlman, A Theorl of the Labor Movement (New York:
Augustus Kelley, 19~9), pp. 239=2~----2For a fuller treatment of the philosophy of the early
American Labor Movement as seen in the AF of L and the mind
of its leader, Samuel Gompers, who piloted the Federation
through 70 years of its most crucial period, see sevent Years
~ Life ~ Labor (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co"
1925 .

r

3
ment--one, the New Deal, pro-labor legislation, from 1932 to
1930; and the other, creation of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO), came about with the split in the House
of Labor over the fate of the industrial worker at the Atlantic
City Convention of the AF of L in 193,.3
The New Deal legislation embodied such important prolabor laws as the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,
the National Labor Relations Act of 193"
Act of 193"

the Social Security

and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

This

legislation was the outcome of a growing social awareness permitted heretofore only in the more "radical" social movements.
This social awareness was beginning to aoquire a "respectable"
atmosphere and, hence, becoming acceptable to even the more
conservative Amerioan social groups.

It was becoming more and

more the recognized duty of the government to provide at least
the means so that all men could attain a minimum of economic
security.

New Deal legislation was both the culmination of

this general recognition and the guide for a formal concretization of the direction toward which economic security was
tending for American workers.
The other factor stimulating the desire for economic

38ee Saul Alensky's intimate biography entitled John 1.
Lewis (New York: G P. Putman's Sons, 19~9) for the factIonal
growth of the industrial versus craft union spirit within the
AF of L during the 1930's.

4
security at this time, although quite intangible in its specific aspects, was nutured by the CIO.

This organization was

established to organize the unorganized, to lift the economic
standards of the mass of dependent workers in this country_
Such cosmic aspirations manifested themselves in the CIO's
predilection for the unSkilled and semi-skilled workers in
auto,

steel, rubber, and coal.

The AF of L, on the other

hand, had always believed that the "aristocracy of labor" in
the key craft unions was the leverage by which organized labor
would win all workers their just share of American industrial
wealth. 4
In light of this resume of prevailing social philosophies
afoot 1n the two main labor federations and the country-atlarge in 1940, it is obvious from what sector new approaches
to income security would spring.

With the "freeze" of wages

by the War Labor Board during World War II the militant CIO
cast about for other ways to satisfy the rank-and-file.

An

elaborate system of Ufringe tt benefits followed, and a new
interest in guaranteed wage plans was resurrected by the CIO
Steelworkers in 1943.

This demand was quickly refused by the

~he fascinating discussion of divergent social philosophies of the AF of Land CIO from 1935 to 1947 is set down by
Eddie Levinson in his journalistic book, Labor on the March
(New York: University Books, 1947).
-- ---

-War Labor Board with this closely-reasoned statement:
The facts set forth by the panel report indicate that
this demand in its present form 'Would, if granted, subJect the industry to such serious financial risks . . .
as to be unworkable. These risks could be reduced by
modifications and safeguards worked out through collective bargaining, but in the present state of the oountry's information on the subject the Board is not prepared . . . to impose suoh guarantees by o~der.'
II.

The Rationale of Guaranteed Wage Plans before 1947
The Steelworkers' proposal was truly a resurreotion of

interest in guaranteed wage plans.

The year 1894 dates the

first recorded guaranteed wage plan,6 but the interest generated in the intervening years until 1943 1s reduced to insignificance by the developments of the last fifteen years.
Wisely, the WPB prevailed on the President of the United
States to authorize a comprehensive study of guaranteed wages
by an independent study of guaranteed wages by an independent
committee.

The PreSident aSSigned the job to the Advisory

Board, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion in 1946,
whioh in turn set-up a research staff known as the Guaranteed
Wage Study, under the direction ot Murry W. Latimer, then

1068.

5Nationa1 War Labor Board, Termination Report (1947), 111,

68 . Harbert Unterberger~ Guaranteed waSi and SunPlementary

unemplo~nt

Inc., 19

Plans
r: Pay
p. 1;.

(New york: Commerce C earing

ouse,

6

chairman of the United States Railroad Retirement Board. 7
The outcome of this study embodied the definitive "Latimer
Report" of 19lt7 which remained the ubible" and most comprehensive guide to guaranteed wage plans up to that time.

In

the Introduction of this 473 page report the projected importance of future guaranteed wage demands was stated in these
words:
The trend toward guaranteed wage demands, unmistakable
though it is has not had sufficient time to become
deeply ingratted in labor organizatiOns and their policy.
Because security is of such great importance, and because
the failure of an ill-advised effort to achieve security
may have tremendous repercussions on the attitude of
workers and on the stability of the economy, every essay
at security should be subjected to critical analysis at
an early stage before emotions become aroused. aSuch a
critical analysis is the object of this report.
For the purposes of its study the Latimer Report defined a
guaranteed wage plan as one ttunder which an employer guarantees to all or a defined unit of his employees a wage or employment for at least 3 months.,,9

The verb "guarantees" in

the above definition is of historical importanoe, for prior
to 1940 the "guarantee" appears to have been conditional since
7Murray Latimer, Guaranteed Wages--Report to the President by the Advisory Board, 19lt7 (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1947).
8.!J?!g., p • l.
9Ibid., p. 2.
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it seems they were financed, where necessary, by the employer
essentially on a pay-as-you-go basis.
However, despite the conditional nature of the wage and
job guarantees which these plans exhibited, there was a steadily increasing acceptance of a real social need for guaranteed
wage protection.

All plans prior to the Social Security Act

of 1935 can generally be attributed to individual social awareness of single employers, or at most, to the initiative of
labor leaders in the skilled or semi-skilled segments of industry.

The solidification of the social need for guaranteed

wage plans was complete with the financial cataclysm of 1929.
The words of the Latimer Report are eloquent in their paucity:
The tragedy, suffering! and frustration which characterized the 12 year period (1929 to 19~1) produced a deeprooted demand for security--of which the guaranteed wage
is becoming one of the most important expressions. 10
The desire of the people for economic security was recognized
by Congress, the legislative culmination was inevitable some
nine years later, when the Congress of the United States passed
the last of two acts which would strongly affect the future of
guaranteed annual wage plans.
The first federal act which was to exert many direct and
indirect influences on guaranteed wage plans was passed by
lOlp'~d., p. 10.

8
Congress in 1935.

The Social Security Act laced together the

four main areas of security which the poor of a nation feel
most keenly--economic security against Sickness, unemployment,
old age, and death.

From the aspect of economic security

against unemployment the Act provided for state rather than
federal administration.
However the federal authority does exercise control over
state administration.

There are a number of situations in

which the state may not deny the eligibly unemployed applicant
his compensation.

The Act makes the following stipulations:

(a) applicant need not accept a job opening which is available
due to a strike, lockout. or other labor dispute, (b) nor if
the wages, hours, or working conditions are substantially less
favorable than those prevailing for Similar work in the locality, and (c) if, as a condition of employment the individual
must jOin, reSign from, or refrain from Joining a bona fide
labor organization. ll
This federal eommittment of responsibility for the unemployed worker proved abortive as a stimulating factor the
growth of guaranteed wage plans.

Concerning the effect of the

Social Security Act upon guaranteed wage plans the Latimer

llJohn G. Turnbull, C. Arthur Williams, and Earl F. Cheit,
Economic and Social Securitr (New York: The Ronald Press Company, I9~ p. 191 ...

9
Report states:
The Social Security Act permitted State laws to include
provisions designed to encourage, within certain limits,
the substitution of a wage guarantee plan for unemployment insurance. Under specified conditions guaranteeing
employers were to be allowed lower unemployment oontributions by rate. At the same time, however, the Social
Seourity Act permitted States to reduce rates to other
employers, under certain Circumstances, on about the
same terms. Because the reduced rates without the wage
guarantee involved no additional financial obligation on
the part of the employer, the wage guarantee provision
offered no advantage. The tormulators of State laws,
therefore, at no time became interested in it to any extent. 12
In tact, the Act had definite regressive effects on guaranteed
wage plans previously negotiated.

The reason for this phenom-

enon is again cited in the Report.
Before the enactment of the Social Secur1ty Act, W1sconsin permitted complete exemption ot employers from the
provisions of the unemployment insurance act if they
guaranteed ln advance 36 hours of work for ~2 weeks.
Some 96 employers sought and were granted exemptions
effective 1n 1934. The law was changed in 1935 to conform with the Social Security Act, and without exception,
emploY!fS promptly discontinued their guaranteed wage
plans. j
The second piece of federal legislatlon which wal to
affect the negotiation of guaranteed wage plans was enacted by
Congress in 1938.

By means of the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938 the federal government attempted to set at least a minimum
l2Latimer, loco clt., pp. 12-13.
13Ibid'

t

p. 13·

-10

standard for wages, hours, and control of child labor.

The

following stipulation in regard to maximum hours was recorded
in Section 7 (a) of the Act: 14
No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in the
section, employ any of his employees who are engaged in
commerce or 1n the production of goods for commerce--for
a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration
of the second year from such date unless such employee
receives compensation for his employment in excess of
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
However, in an effort to encourage the idea of regular employment by employers, the Act made the following exemption from
Section 7 (a):
• . • if an employer and a certified union entered into
a collective bargaining agreement which provided for
ei ther a maximum of fifty-two weeks of em'ployment for
2 000 hours (changed to 2 080 hours 1n 19~1); or twentyweeks of work for 1,000 hours. Where such contracts
were bargained, employers were permitted to average out
overtime, and ~o work employees up to twelve hours a day,
or fifty-six hours a week without incurring penalty. If
the 2,080 or 1,040 hoursla&xima were eXceeded, the overtime exemption was lost. ,

sIx

However, this provision also proved abortive, as a means of
stimulating the growth of guaranteed wage or employment plans.
The statistical proof of this ineffectiveness is again suc14~
/2

U. S. Stat. c. 1060, sec. 31,107 (1938).
referred to as the Wage and Hour Law.

Commonly

l'Turnbull at al., loco cit., p. 448. In Chapter 16 a
fine analySiS 1s presented of the legislative history behind
the Fair Labor Standards Act and its impact today. (See
footnote 11 above.)

11

oinctly stated in the Report: l6
In more than 8 years since the Fair Labor Standards Act
went into effect only 60 such agreements or proposed
agreements have been filed with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, which administers the
act. Of these, apparently no more than 14 covered an
operating plan involving a waiver of premium overtime.
The total number of operating plans, so far as is known,
has been less than 20. At present, at the end of 8
years, apparently only 6 plans involving the overtime
waiver are in operation.
In summary of the overall effect of legislation on the
pre-l9~7

experiments in private guaranteed wage plans and those

covering also employment, the Report states:
In part, the meager results of intended legislation encouragements reflects the fact that a succeSSful guaranteed wage plan must be highly individualistic. Thls
characteristlc makes the legislating of encouragements a
matter of peculiar difficulty. This does not mean that
legislative encouragement is imposslble. In the past,
however, efforts have been based upon erroneous notions
of the king of encouragement needed. The notlon that a
guarantee of wages can properly be substituted for unemployment lnaurance is an example. The two are really
complementary and would work better together than independently. This legislation intended to encourage guaranteed wages would be more fruitful if it permitted guarantees by waY70f supplementation to unemployment benefit
lnsurance.~

III.

The Rationale of Guaranteed Annual Wage Plans after
The 1ncreased interest 1n guaranteed wage plans since
l6Lat1mer, ~ clt., p. 13.
l7Ib1d.

19~7

12

1947 is due,

in

a significant degree, to the scholarly research

which produced the Latimer Report.

In its complete and un-

biased assessment of legislative, economic, and social events
which have influenced the history of guaranteed wage plans
over the past fifty years, the Report has become the indispensable guide for scholar and practitioner alike of guaranteed
wage plans.

The impaot of the Report oan hardly be overesti-

mated, for, even though there has been a deep-rooted demand
for security in the United States since 1929, there must be
an instrument by Which this demand can be satisfied.

If a

social demand is created with no means of satisfaction only
frustration can ensue.

Although the Latimer Report was not

specific in outlining the best form of employment security
device to

follo~,

to discerning labor, management, and legis-

lative leaders the specific outlines for successful guaranteed
wage plans were adequately analyzed. le
The definitive sentence in the recommendations of the
Latimer Report which effected all provate guaranteed wage at~empted

since 1947 states:

18The Latimer Report includes a comprehensive review of
guaranteed wage plans, cost estimates for guaranteeing wages
in number of establishments, and recommendations of measures
~hieh would increase the feasibility and applicability of
guaranteed wages, as well as an analysis of the economic
effects of guaranteed wages.

13
Thus legislation intended to encourage guaranteed wages
would be more fruitful if it permitted guarantees by way
of supplementation of unemployment insurance. 19
This concept, of a wage guarantee "by way of supplementation
to unemployment insurance," has made its impact felt in almost
every guaranteed pay plan since the promulgation of the Latimer
Report.

As the initiative tor earlier plans came from manage-

ment who were considerably enlightened and progressive-Proctor and Gamble, Hormel, and Nunn-Bush--so the renascence
of guaranteed wage plans after the Latimer Report were initiated almost exclusively by union leaders.
The ineffectual efforts of the Steelworkers to secure a
guaranteed wage plan from the War Labor Board in 1943 did not
end their attempts.

Using the findings ot the Latimer Report

the Steelworkers submitted a significantly revised pay plan to
the Wage Stabilization Board in 1951.

One author has made the

following comparison between the principal features of the
1951 and 1943 plans introduced by the Steelworkers. 20
(1) Employees with three years of continuous service were
to be covered--not every employee as previously proposed.
(2) The employers' costs were to be limited to an agreed19Latimer, ~. cit., p. 13.
20Unterberger ~. cit., p. 18, cited from A Guaranteed
~age Plan for the WorKerS-Ot the Steel IndustrY,-Unlon-EiEIbit
o. 1~9;IT, Wage Stabilization Board Case No. D-18-C.

14
upon rate of contribution to a trust fund. Approximately seven cents per hour vas suggested--far different from the unlimited liability previously proposed.
(3) For each week in vhich the employee was laid off or

terminated because of shutdown, up to a maximum of
52 consecutive weeks the employee vas to receive 30
times the standard hourly wage rate for the job class
in which he worked more hours than any other during
the preceding 13 weeks.

(4) Out of the trust fund, the laid-off employee would be

paid the difference between any state unemployment
compensation benefits payable to him and his guaranteed amount.

An employee vho had income from employment in a week
in which he was eligible for benefits would be entitled to the difference between his income and his
guaranteed amount plus $10.
(6) To receive benefits a covered employee would have to

be able to work and be available for suitable work.

The initiative for a more widespread application of economic security for the working masses was now placed where it
would be more effective.

A powerful union like the Steelwork-

ers with a membership of 1,250,000 strategically located in
basic and processed steel industries allover the United States
was in a most advantageous position to exert widespread influence on the future of guaranteed wage plans.

This influence

was reinforced by the higher degree of centralized control
which has characterized the eIO industrial unions since their
inception in 1935.

Also, the heavy concentration of low-paid

unskilled and semi-Skilled workers in the industrial unions
made guaranteed wage plans a greater necessity than it would

have been for the skilled craft workers of the AF of L with
their high salaries and built-in seasonal compensations.

How-

ever, the Steelworkers proposal was not activated in any
labor-management agreement during 1951.

The introduction of

a guaranteed wage plan as a supplement to unemployment benefits would have to await another strong industrial union's
initiative.
The United Automobile Workers, CIO, entered the research
on union-inspired guaranteed wage plans in 1951.

Its impaot

was soon felt and progress reports were released periodioally
to the public as a reminder of things to oome.

Guaranteed

annual wages (GAW) became hot-copy for every business or
labor-orientated periodicals in the country.

The following

extracts are charaoteristic:
An economic time bomb is about to go off on the labormanagement front. If the blast occurs, it will be over
the demands of Walter Reuther's United Automobile Workers
for a guaranteed annual wage.2~

The guaranteed annual wage, as the demand is generally
known, or the guaranteed employment plan, as the U.A.W.
more correctly terms it, is not Simply a plan for supplementary unemployment compensitIon. . . • Walter Ruether's
aim-is vastly different. What he proposes is a system of
penalties to force the industry to abandon its seasonal
pattern of production and marketlng1 to provide year-round
work for workers with seniority. Ie he should win, then
the next step . • • would be to end the system of hiring

21Francis J. Corrigan, "Big G.A.W. Debate," Soclal Order,
V (April, 1955), 15,.

-16
a factory worker by the hour, and to pay him instead by
the week. 22
All eyes were on Detroit and GAW became a fait accompli in the
auto industry on June 30, 1955,

This initial contract with

the Ford Motor Company immediately doubled the number of workers covered by guaranteed wages in the United States.

Chrysler

and General Motors succumbed quickly to similar demands of the
U.A.W., and a new era for GAW was begun.
capitalized on the U.A.W.

fS

The Steelworkers

initiative and soon proposed and

secured GAW agreements with Amerioan Can Company and Continental Can.
It was soon apparent that GAW was a misnomer for the new
j

type of guarantee plans.

The new plans were denominated sup-

plementary Unemployment Benefits Plans (SUB).

The labor edi-

tor tor America briefly reoords the philosophy behind this
name change:
Strictly speaking. the term "guaranteed annual wage" is a
misnomer. As originally advooated by the late Phillip
Murray toward the end of World War II it meant exactly
what it says: the guarantee by an empioyer to an employe
of 52 tull paychecks 1n the oourse of a year.
That is not what it means today in Detroit or Pittsburgh
or Chicago, where the Auto Workers, the Steelworkers, and
the Paokinghouse Workers are demanding a "guaranteed
annual wage." What these unions are really asking for is

1955,

22Daniel Bell, "Beyond the 'Annual Wage,
p. 92.

Itt

Fortune, May,

17
an employer-fi~anced
compensation. 2j

s~pplemen~

!g

~~employment ~~nefits

One reason tor the advance of guaranteed plans is wellexpressed by the following statement:
Labor's new demands are bolstered by a serious decline in
the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages--off more than
20 percent from pra-war figures.
If present compensation could be doubled so that workers
received approximately 60 percent of their wages in benefits, there would not be the crescendo shout for the
guaranteed annual wage.
The same would hold if the eligible period were extended
from 26 to 40 or more weeks.2~
Add to this the bargaining power of many American labor unions
and the success of SUB is apparent.
This is an excellent example of Pope Pius IX's principle
of subsidiarity in action.

In lieu of state intervention to

supplement the inadequacies of unemployment insurance which
have steadily increased over the past 20 years, the private
institutions by bargaining initiative can and should seek to
settle this problem in the most equitable manner for all concerned.

Rev. Joseph M. Becker, 8.J., a recognized authority

on social security makes this pertinent remark regarding the
23Benjamin L. Masse, ttGuaranteed Wages and Jobless Pay, U
America, XCIII (April 9, 1955), 37.

24Ibid.~ cited for T~amster's Report from Washington,
Fe bruarY;-!9, 5.

18
Ford Plan as accepted by the industry from the U.A.W.: 2 5
A favorable aspect ot G.A.W. in the auto industry is that
it relies on private group activity rather than on governmental activity to meet the threat of unemployment.
Although the Auto Workers' plan has held the spotlight
for GAW and gained the publicity--due to the auto manufacturer's pivotal position in the American industrial complex-there has been other successful union-inspired plans at work.
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (lET) was able to
negotiate GAW plans in their cartage and wholesale warehoasing
union contracts as far back as November 11, 1952.

At that

time Teamsters' Local 688 of Joint Council No. 13 in St. Louis
contracted for GAW with Brown Shoe Company of the same city.
With the subsequent prosecution ~f union contracts from 1953-

1955 Local 638 negotiated GAW with 68 firms for about 4,500 of
its 10,017 members. 26
Rice-Stix, Inc., a wholesale clothing manufacturer with
a warehousing operation in St. Louis was the second firm to
contract the GAW with Local 688 on March 1, 1953.

On May 5,

1955 Local 688's publicity director could write concerning the
CAW plans it had negotiated on the St. Louis area:

25Joseph M. Becker, "G. A. W. for the Auto Workers," Social
Order, June, 1955, p. 203.
.
26uWages and Working Conditions,," Bulletin of Teamster's
Local 683, St. LOUiS, January 30, 19,6.
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While the program of unemployment in the St, Louis area
has created several acute situations, it has not been
deep enough to affect the protected areas of the guaranteed wage program. Therefore, the Union's experience
under the program to date has been perhaps more academic
and in the nature of refining principles and mechanics
of future operations, than in the practical considerations that may be ~yolved in any day-to-day developments
within the program. (
The need for this statement was precipitated by the widespread
inquiry into GAW generated by the impending U.A.W. guaranteed
wage plan with the auto industry.

The Bureau of National

Affairs made a study of GAW a short time before the above
statement was released, and concerning the plans of Local 688
they commented:
Contractually, the St. Louis guaranteed annual wage plan
represents as simple and brief an approach to this muchdebated issue a negotiator is likely to find.
This area of purely "academic" experience with the GAW
plans was to change for the Teamsters in a short time.

With

the national decline of the wholesale warehousing industry
Rice-Stix saw that its GAW committment would soon be put to
the test.
srJB

On liovember 30, 1956 the GAW was modified into an

plan by joint approval of the Company and!Jnion

4

Although this plan covered only 420 workers--65 percent
of the total employees--in a single warehousing operation, it
27"Guaranteed Annual Wage Plan, n Re port of Teamster's
Local 688, May 5, 1955.

20

supplied an excellent opportunity to study the impact ot an
actual

s~rn

plan in a condition of permanent lay-off.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Late in 19,2 Local 688 of the St. Louis Teamsters devised
a Five-Year Package Contract 1n tlan effort to establish maximum confidence in the area of labor-management relations. u20
This contract was a creation of the union's research division
and sought to "eliminate the piecemeal, irrational and somewhat emotional approach to the traditional collective bargaining process, without sacrificing the historical perogatives of
either side.,,29

Besides the wage increases this package con-

tract included a guaranteed annual wage, hot cargo clause
(worker does not have to handle goods of a struck firm), costof-living escalator, insurance-pension, health and hospital,
and blood donor provisions.

During the calendar year of 19,3

approximately 40 percent of Local 638's 10,017 members were
brought under the a~verage of Five Year Package plans. 30
28rrom an interview with Edward Brown, Chief Negotiator,
Teamster's Local 6a8, on January 14, 19,a,
29Ibid., January 14, 19,8.
30wages and Workin, Condit10ns, Series No. 21 January 1,
1954, JoInt councIl ofeamsters Ro. 13, Internat10nal Brotherhood of -Teamsters , p. 12.
21
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The key issue underlying Five Year contract is maximum
job and union security.

The provision of a guaranteed annual

wage fs more conducive to maximum job security for the worker
than any other provision in the Five Year plan.

As of

Dece~

ber 31, 1953 there were 65 firms employing 4,530 employees
covered by the guaranteed annual wage proviSion. 3l
Why had the Teamsters included this GAW provision in
their contract at this particular time?

The motivation behind

the Teamsters' GAW drive, according to the Teamster spokesman
who negotiated the plan, was "to provide sOllie income security
to workers in an insecure industry. ,,32 The strategic geographical position of St. Louis early marked the city as a
center of the wholesale distribution industry.

By 19,0, how-

ever, the whole industry was in a state of decline.
decline can be traced to a series of factors.

This

Retail market-

ing operators were in the process of evolution and the chain
store was the principal dynamic factor.

These stores faoili-

tated a condition of large-scale buying directly from the
manufacturing concern with the consequent decline ot neighborhood dry-goods stores.

Technological advances also demanded

3l Ibid., p. 16 (see Appendix A tor a summary of all the
GAW plans negotiated by Local 688 ot the St. Louis Teamsters).
32 Interview with Looal 688 1 s Field Director, April 4,
1958.
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a change in warehousing techniques, if the industry was to
maintain its competitive advantage or, at least, position.
For the most part the old-line St. Louis distribution firms
were insensible to the signs of the times, and consequently,
the union saw 1ay-offs ahead if renovations were not made.

It

even teared that some firms might vacate the St. Louis area
tor less-unionized areas.

In at least one case, according to

the Teamster union, there was a definite decision to do

80.

These faotors caused the research men of the Teamster
union to devise an off-setting security device in order to
protect its rank-and-fi1e.

In some instances the GAW plan was

designed to deter some firms from moving out of town, and in
others as an incentive to stabilize operations.

In the latter

instance the 60 percent coverage was designed to permit f1exibility--nto give them something to live with, II as one Teamster
official expressed it.
The first St. Louis firm with whom Local 68d negotiated
the GAW plan was the Brown Shoe Company on November 1"

1952.

Rice-Stix contraoted the GAW obligation March 1, 1953 to beoome the second firm oovered by the plan.

From 1953 to 1955,

63 more firms contracted the GAW, which was merely one of the
six important prOVisions of the Five-Year Plan.
The provision of the GAW plan in the contraots of all 65
firms was substantially the same.

The plan is quite simple

and briefly expressed as was mentioned before when discussing
the Bureau of National Affairs comment on the Teamster's GAW.
The Rlce-Stix Company, with a total work force of 700, had
the following representative plan:
It is understood and agreed that the first 420 employees
on the seniority list shall be guaranteed employment for
at least 2,000 straight time hours each contract year
beginning with March 1, 1953. This guarantee shall be
absolute and not be excused for any reason excepting the
failure or refusal of employees to work or for discharge
for cause or for military leave, or for mutually agreed
upon leave of absence. Further, this guarantee shall be
exclusive of overtime hours worked which shall not be
counted against or included in the guarantee.
It is understood that whenever there is a separation
of any individual who was covered by the guarantee the
next employee on the seniority list shall replaoe the
separated individual on the guaranteed list so that the
number (420) is maintained. Furthermore, it is understood that any employee returning from service in the
Armed Forces! or anyone returning from a mutually agreed
upon leave or absence will displace on the guaranteed
list anyone who was hl red to replace him during his
absence, and that said displaced individual will be
dropped from the guaranteed list. The returning employee
will so far as the guarantee is concerned take the hours
of employment of the individual whom he displaced and the
Company will therefore, during the balance of that year
be required to guarantee the returning employee only the
differenoe between 2,000 hours and the total worked by
his replacement prior to his return.
This guarantee shall continue in effect until March
1, 1955 and from year to year thereafter, during the
period of this contract, unless the Company gives notice
at least sixty (60) days prior to March 1 1955, or any
subsequent Maroh 1, of its desire to modify this guarantee. In the event such notioe is given the parties Shall
oonfer in an effort to reach agreement but in the event
the parties are unable to reach agreement then the Union
shall at the expiration of sixty (60) days following the
said notioe have the right to resort to its economic
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strength to support its position. 33
What has been said above concerning the general conspectus of the St. Louis conditions can be applied, ! !2+.tiori,
to the Rice-Stix operation.

Rice-Stix experienced healthy cor-

porate growth through ninety-three years of its eXistence, but
stagnancy of technological progress began to take its toll in
1947.

The Company
fell from a net income of 19.5 percent of
,

capital invested (including contingenoy, reserves and earned
surplus, but exoluding inoome tax reserves) in 1946 to a low
of 2.7 peroent in 1953. 34
At the time of negotiations in Maroh of 1953 there was no
sign ot a need for the GAW plan which the Company and Union
had negotiated as a normal contract provision.

The 60 percent

seniority coverage seemed to provide a more than adequate
~rgin

tor business fluctuations and possible lay-offs,

Even

when "changes in metnods of warehousing and distribution were
anticipated,,3; it still seemed that the need for the use of

33A&reement by and between Rice-Stix, Ino. and Warehouse
and Distribution Workers Union Local 638, St. LouiS, Missouri.
See Appendix A for the minor differences between the CAW plans
as contraoted by the Teamster represented firms.
4
3 See Appendix B for the net income figures of Rlce-Stix
trom 1947 to 1954.
35Management Record, "GAW with an SUB Twist," June, 1957,
p. 194.
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GAW was comfortably improbable.
19~.

However, this whole conspectus had changed by late

The Company profit margin was at 2.7 percent and its owners
were trying to hold off a stock raid by a New York textile
concern.

On November 26, 1954 The Wall Street

a story of the proceedings with this title.

~ournal

carried

TEAMSTERS FOREGO

PAY RISE TO HELP RICE-STIX BATTLE RELIANCE'S OFFER.

The union

had agreed to forego the pay increases called for by the

5

year agreement in order to keep the ownership ot the Company
in St. Louis.
The Company had approached the union as early as September
seeking mitigation from the forthcoming wage increases contracted in the Five Year Plan eighteen months earlier.

The

Union was unwilling to grant these concessions maintaining
"that improvements in efficiency would man that the Company
would be able to handle the forthcoming increases in wages.,,3 6
These "improvements in efficiencytf failed to materialize and
the profit margin oontinued to decline.

The stock of Rice-

Sttx had been averaging $30 to $32 per share during the summer
on the American Stock Exchange.

However, at the same time

equity per common share was placed at $69.49. 37
36case Problems in Industrial Relations, Institute of
Labor Reiations, UnIverSity of IllinoIs (referred to hereafter
as Case Problems), p. 5.
37corporat1on Records, Standard and Poor.
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In protestations to the Union, management officials
pointed out that low return on Company investment and the consequent reduction in dividends had depressed the price of the
stock.

In an attempt to rebut this statement the Union main-

tained that dividends could have been paid due to the Company's
strong position in terms of liquid assets and reserves, if the
Company had any real desire to hold up the price of its stock
on the Exchange.

As a result of the Company's financial posi-

tion, it presented an attractive situation for sharp investors
to gain control with the object of liquidating for the quick
profits from the salable assets.

Reliance Manufacturing Co.,

a New York textile oamp any , was reported buying large blooks
of Rice-Stix stock for reasons of the prospective liquidation
profit and in order to use the Rice-Stix brand names on
Reliance products.
In light of these dark prospects the Union entered into
an effort with management to defeat the advances of Reliance
Manufacturing Company.

On Thanksgiving Eve 19,4, the manage-

ment and Union carried their problem to the rank-and-file in a
meeting at Kiel Auditorium in St. Louis.

A management spokes-

man presented the intentions of Reliance, as he saw it, and
the Union leadership asked for a vote of confidence in the
negotiating committee.

The leadership assured the union mem-

bers that it would do all that it possibly could to protect
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the standing pension and job security agreements and to make
the best possible supplemental agreement.

There was some

opposition to the proposition, but the membership voted

30~

to 146 to support the leadership's request,38
The negotiating committee acted quickly and two days
later the newspapers carried this report:

"while the rest

of St. Louis ate Thanksgiving Dinner, a three-man committee
from Local 688 of the Teamsters met with three Rice-Stic officials in a huge, silent warehouse.

There they hammered out a

memorandum in which the union gave up wage increases and fringe
benefits estimated to total $800,000 over the remainder of the
contract which runs to February 28, 1958. tl39 Eight days later
on December 4, 1954 the price of stock had shot up on RiceStix stock to $45 per share on the American Stock Exchange,
due to the interest created by the raiders and the publicity
given the company because of the union concession.

With this

brighter earnings picture brought about by fixing labor costs
and with union cooperation in effecting savings, the Company
could concentrate on stream-lining its warehousing operation. 40
However, the Jnlon concessions did not seem to convince Earnest
38Case Problems, p, 14.
39~all Street Journal, Friday, November 26, 1954, p

40Business Week, December 4, 1954, p. 118.
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w.

Stix and Fred B. Eiseman, president and vice-president, re-

spectively, even after they had promised "they would not sell
their stock to Reliance. ,,41 On December 19, 1954 these men
sold their combined holdings to Reliance at $46 per share,
after having decided "that Reliance at present already controlled enough stock to force a proxy fight. ,,42
The Teamsters had come to the rescue of Rice-Stix in
order Uta keep the Company in friendly hands of men who wanted
to operate, instead of letting someone just interested in
liquidation for fast profit take over the business.,,43

With

the sale of Rice-Stu to Reliance all the Union's fears were
to come true.

After a protracted proxy fight between Reliance

and Safie Bros_, a New York textile manufacturer, the Safies
came out on top.44 Thus only eight months after Reliance had
gained control of Rice-Stix it was to lose it in a struggle
with Safie.
The Safie Bros. coup g'

!1!!

was delivered on August 27,

1955 and on September 10, 1955 Business Week dramatically
41Ibid ., December 25, 1954, p. 60 .
....2 Ibig .
43Business Week, December 14, 195.... , p. 117.
44See Appendix C for an interesting description of the
power contest between Reliance and Safie Bros. in F9rtune
magazine, October, 1955, p. 177.
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described the power contest:

"Rice-Stu, Inc., . '

would

now wound up in control of Safie Bros., a New York Textile
company.

The latest episode in the Rice-Stix serial starred

Joseph

Safie, executive vice-president of Safie Bros. lilt,

M,

With Rice-Stix controlled by Satie Bros., it looked as
if the Teamsters Union and its members would have a more promising future for security in their jobs.

This hope was

strengthened on February 21, 19,6 when Safie renewed the lease
on Rice-Stix's Washington Avenue property in St. Louis for
another ten years at the cost of nearly one million dollars. lt6
During June 19,6 Safie consolidated its position in the
wholesale women's garment industry by acquiring the holdings
of two Los Angeles firms ($1,000,000) and two Atlanta firms
(price not given).~7
As the efforts of the Teamsters to assist the original
Stix-Eiseman owners had failed, the Union decided on reinstatement of the wage increase of May 1, 19".48 Within six months
the future of Rice-Stix has been mapped-out by the Saties, and
the following report was made public:

"Rice-Stu stockholders

4'~USi~ Week, September 19, 19",
lt6Standard and Poor, Corporation Records, April, 19,6.
lt7rug., August, 19,6 .
43GloB!-pemocrat (St. Louis), July 13, 1956
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approve sale of Company's manufacturing plants and mills so as
to concentrate on sales and distribution. ,,49
With this major reorganization planned, Safie saw that
the Rice-Stix GAW would constitute a heavy liability,

In

accordance with the original contract, which called for reopening privileges if either party so deSired, the Union was
called in and after negotiations were completed both labor and
management agreed to substitute a supplemental benefit (SUB)
program to be known as the Income Security Plan in place of
the old GAW plan.

This amended agreement enabled the Company

to cut their original liability by an amount equal to $26 per
week for 26 weeks, Which laid-off workers are entitled to by
the provisions of the Missouri State Unemployment Program
Things moved quickly now and on December 14, 19,6 a stock
journal carried this entry:

"Pursuant to Company's plan of re-

organization approved by the stockholders on November 26, 1956
common stockholders have been invited to tender shares for sale
to the Company at $69 per share.It'O

This reorganization re-

duced the Riee-Stix capital stock and surplus from 20.3 million
to 8.1 million dollars. 51 Total employment at the Company was

49~., November 30, 1956.
50~~odl Industrials, December 14, 1956.

51~usiness We!!, December 1, 1956,
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now 368 persons.

Even in the face of a guaranteed annual. wage,

;2 employees found work elsewhere since a lay-off seemed inevitable.

On December

l~,

19;6 the Rice-Stix warehousing oper-

ations laid-off permanently 68 of the total employment of 368.
Even with this significant move there was no offioial
statement concerning the future of the Rice-Stix warehousing
operation.

It was evident, however, that the st. Louis oper-

ation was to be curtailed as layoffs continued during January
19;7.

By January 31, 19;7 Rice-Stix has laid-off 130 employees

with eligibility under the amended agreement of November 30,
19;6.

Another

1n March.;2

~O

employees were laid-off in February and

~d

Company officials finally made public their plan

for Rice-Stix when they give this statement to the papers on
March 22, 19;7:

"This move from St. Louis to New York 1s part

of management's plan to concentrate on the more profitable
lines of its business.,,;3
Personnel were dismissed as soon as liquidation would
permit in the respective departments of the cler1cal and operative sections of the warehouse.

By May 31 only a handful of

key personnel remained, and their duties were mostly concerned
with administration of the supplementary unemployment benefit
;2Rice-Stix Personnel Files,
;3Glote-Democrat, March 22, 19;7.
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plan.

A final press release was given to the local papers on

November 12, 1957=

"Liquidation of Rlce-Stix, Inc., .

moved nearer to completion today when the stockholders voted
to dissolve the corporation, with assets to be sold to Reliance
Manufacturing Co., New York City, for book value. u5l.t This
amounted to no more than a book entry for Reliance already
owned 99t percent of Rice-Stix stock..

However, this date does

record the final denoument of a 9l.t-year-old St. Louis firm
which once has a work force of 900 employees.
The amended agreement of the CAW plan of
was now one year old.

~Iovember

30, 1956

Reliance had laid-off 68 workers under

the terms of this plan one year before on December 13, 1956.
Consequently, on December 31, 1957 these 63 workers either
terminated their eligibility to draw benefits or exhausted
their benefits altogether.

January 31, 1958 terminated the

eligibility of 78 more ex-employees,

The final cut-off date

of the Plan came on February 28, 1958, since the remaining 222
workers originally covered by the Plan were put on the laidoff roster the preceding February when the Company announced
its liquidation plans.

/'

5l.t I bid., November 12, 1957.

,\

~

:. :

CHAPTER III
THE PLAN
Following the events described in Chapter One, the

Co~

pany and the Union agreed to a modification of the original
Guaranteed Annual Wage Provision, a modification resulting in
a switch to a Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Plan.

The

complete amending agreement has been incorporated as an appendix.
This SUB, known as the "Income Security Plan, tt re-defined
the obligation under the guaranteed annual wage to mean that
for a period of 2,000 hours after layoff an employee would be
guaranteed the same take-home pay that he would have received
had he continued in Rice-Stix employ.

However, the laid-off

employee would now have to register for state unemployment
compensation and seek other employment in order to receive the
payment.

In addition, it would be agreed that any income the

laid-off employee received from unemployment compensation or
other employment could be deducted from the company's obligation.

The pertinent provisions and administrative provisions

are included as follows:
Financing - The company was to make contributions to a
fund set up under a trustee.

The initial contribution was to
3l.t
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be no less than 10 percent of payroll, with additional contributions made by the company as required to maintain the fund
1n a liquid state.

Money 1n the fund was to be invested in

government securities, with earnings therefrom credited to the
fund.

The fund paid all costs of administering the plan.
Amount of Applicant's Weekly Benefit - An eligible appli-

oant was entitled to an amount, which when added to his state
unemployment benefit would equal 100 percent of his weekly
after tax straight time pay_

An applicant's weekly after-tax

straight time pay was to be his regular gross weekly wages
reduced by the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal taxes
which would be required to be withheld by the Company from the
applicant's regular weekly gross wages if employed in the bargaining unit.

For those weeks in which the applicant is not

entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, and such ineligibility is not for reasons listed in Article V, Section 2
(a) of the plan, and provided the applioant had registered for
unemployment compensation benefits within five days following
date of lay-off, he was eligible for benefits from the Fund at
the rate of the wage that he would have received if he were to
remain at worle

Each week for which an applicant received a

weekly wage from an employer other than the Company he was to
be paid a weekly benefit equal to the difference between his
regular gross weekly wages received from the Company and the
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wage received from other employment, provided that such wages
are less than the applicant's weekly wage regularly received
from the Company at the time of lay-off,
It the employee, after filing an application, is deter-

mined to be eligible for benefits under the Income

S~curity

Plan (Article V), an authorization is forwarded to the Payroll
Department with instructions to pay the employee the difference
between the net earnings from Rice-Stix at the time of layoff
and the present net earnings trom unemployment compensation or
wages from another employer.

A check is then made out by the

Payroll department and mailed to the eligible employee on the
Monday following the Friday tor which he or she made application tor benetits.
Disqualifioation - An employee is disqualified for benefits under the Plan if he or she does not meet all the requirements as speoified throughout the plan.

It was agreed that the

employee make application for benefits on a weekly basis regardless of whether the employee received wages from another
employer semi-monthly or monthly.
Employment - The Personnel Division as part of its function in processing the claims for benefits also referred employees laid off under the plan to prospeotive employers.

The

Personnel Division has maintained a close relationship with
the Missouri State Employment Service 1n obtaining pOSitions

for employees under the plan,
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The Union also was committed to

help in any way that it could in the placement of laid-off
workers.
Computation of Payments Under the Plan - The SUB program
calls for a guarantee of the net pay of the individual employee.

Since it is the net pay that is guaranteed, it is

necessary to f1gure the tax upon the net pay, rather than the
old gross, as usually 1s done with payrolls.
In the case of an employee who is drawing unemployment
compensation, it is first necessary to fieure what his net pay
would have been had he continued work at Rice-Stix.

After th1s

figure 1s derived, the amount of unemployment compensation is
subtracted from it, leav1ng the amount that is due to the employee.
In order to reach a new gross pay, since the contract
calls for the trusteeship to be liable for any withholding tax
that is due on these earnings, 1t is necessary to take the net
pay, subtraot the number of dependents that the employee is
claiming, multip11ed by $13.00 from the net amount due the employee, then cont1nue to multiply this answer by 18 percent
until a zero f1gure i8 reaohed.

An example:

Suppose an em-

ployee was making $60.00 per week under R1ce-Stix,

H1s Soc1al

Secur1ty tax on that $60.00 would have been $1.35.

H1s with-

holding tax if he was claim1ng one dependent, would have been

38
88.46, and City Tax would have been 30¢ (City tax is

t

of 1

peroent of gross wage), which would have meant that his net pay
would have been

$~9.89.

If this employee is drawing unemployment compensation,
$25.00 would be subtracted if he were receiving maximum compensation, from the $49.39 leaving a total of $24.89, which the
company would owe him under the plan; but in addition to this
liability, the Company would also be liable for any taxes
which the employee might have to pay on this $24.89.

To fig-

ure this tax liability, it is necessary to take the $24.89,
subtract from that $13.00, which is the value of one exemption
for one week, which would leave $11.89 which the employee is
receiving on which Rice-Stix incurs a tax liability for that
employee.

To figure the amount of withholding tax which this

employee would have to pay on this net pay of $11.80 to cover
any liability he has for such taxes, it is necessary to multiply the $11.89 by 18 percent which is the withholding tax rate.
The answer to this multiplication is $2.14 but we also have to
figure 18 percent of the $2.14 because
the employee received.

$2.1~

is the net which

The answer to this multiplication is

38 percent which is an additional 71 of tax liability, and repeating the process of multiplying 7¢ by ld percent another
cent is added.

Now adding the $2,14, 38¢ and 7¢ and l¢ you

arrive at a total of $2.60 which is the amount of taxes that
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the employee would have to pay on a net of $11,89.
To arrive at the gross amount that is payable to this
employee, it is necessary to take the $24-.89 that is coming to
him in net pay, add to that the $2.60, which is the figure
added for withholding tax, a gross payment of $27.4-9 is paid
the employee.
For an employee who has obtained another job, but a job
that does not pay as much as the wages he was receiving at
Rice-Stix, the following procedure 1s used:"
Rice-5tix

other Employer

Gross _ ... _.. ... •
.. $60.00
Withholding tax ----- $8.46
Social Security tax - 1.35
Ci ty tax - .
.30 10.11
0

Net Pay - - - -

0

Example:

............--- $4.9.89

Gross -. "....... _......,

-- $50.00

Withholding tax ----- $6.60
Social Security tax - 1.13
City tax ~------.-.-,25

8.Q4

Net Pay - - _............ - - $41,96

Net Pay Rice-Stlx ---- $49.89
LeSI Net Pay Other 41 .. 96
Additional SUB Check - $ 7.93
Withholding Tax Computation

0----

Tax at Rice-5Ux - -......
$8.46
Tax new employer _ ....... - 6.62

SUB

SUB Tn: LiabilitY'M

SUB Gross ---------- .. ------ $9.73

..

... $1.80

now due employee - - - $7.93
Add withholding tax -------- ltiP

Eligibility (Article V) - An applicant is eligible for a
,5This method of computation was the one actually used
The author recognizes that a simultaneous equation would be
less cumbersome to use. E,g., where t == wi~hholding taxes and
g == gross income then g - t = $24-. d9 and .18 (g - $13) = t,

weekly supplemental benefit only if he has been laid off or
severed from the company's payroll subsequent to the effective
date of the plan for any reason beyond the employee's control
and if the applioant:
1.

Has registered within tive days of the date of

lay-ott and reported to (on at least a weekly basis) an employment office maintained by the State and the Placement Service
maintained by the Union and to accept job referrals to or to
accept and continue in employment deemed suitable under the
definitions and rulings of the State system.
2.

Has received unemployment compensation benefits

or was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits
only (1) because such week is the first week of the regular
"waiting period" required to be served under the State Unemployment Compensation system or (2) the applicant did not have
prior to his layoff, a sufficient period of work covered by
the State system or (3) because of a limit, under the State
system of the period of time for Which State unemployment compensation benefits are payable.

3.

Has been employed by the Company or any other

employer for compensation or remuneration in an amount (gross
wages) less than the gross weekly wages which the applicant received When last employed by the Company and further has presented the necessary evidence of this fact to the Trustee of

41
the Plan.

If an employee receives unemployment oompensation

or wages for a partial week the employee will be paid at a prorated benefit for that week.

This benefit will also be paid

aocording to whether the employee was able and willing to work
and otherwise eligible according to the plan.
Duration of Benefits (Article VI) - Benefits will begin
with the third week after layoff and continue for a maximum
number of weeks or a maximum number of hours of benefits, not
to exceed a total of fifty weeks, or a total of two thousand
hours, whichever is the lesser, within the period of fiftytwo weeks beginning with the date of layoff and limited to the
expiration date of the plan, or the expiration date ot the
collective bargaining agreement or any extention, whichever
oocurs earlier.
An employee laid off and subsequently recalled to the
Company's payroll in accordance with the covering seniority
provisions, who was again laid off at a subsequent date, was
entitled to the benefits for the maximum period from date last
laid off and no time or benefits received during previous
periods of layoffs were charged against the employee.
Employees who are otherwise eligible to receive benefits
under the Income Security Plan, but are idled because of a
strike or a picket line established at the company at which
they are employed, are entitled to the "insurance tl period of
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the plan extended by the time lost because of such strike or
picket line provided that the employee makes written application for such extension.
To remain eligible under the program an applicant must:
1.

Visit the Unemployment Office maintained by the

State at least on a weekly basis and accept referrals to or
employment deemed suitable under the system.
2.

Visit the employment office maintained by the

0nion at least on a weekly basis and accept referrals to or
employment deemed suitable by the standard of the State Unemployment system.

3. Visit Rice-Stix and apply for supplemental unemployment benefits on a weekly basis.
~.

Accept all referrals made by the company to

other firms known to be employing personnel.

5.

Accept employment offered by any firms referred

to by the Company, Unemployment Service and Union ofrice if
,

deemed suitable under the State system.

6.

Be actively seeking employment on his own ini-

tiative and furnish proof he is actively seeking employmeht,

7.

Report all income whether it be unemployment

compensation or wages from another employer.
ings must be reported.

d.

Be available and able to work.

Any partial earn-
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9·

Receive a weekly income less than that earned

at Rice-Stix at time of layoff,
10,

Report on a weekly basis

No claims may be

filed on an accumulated basis.
11.

Report any change of employment status"

12.

If idled because of a strike or picket line

established at the company where presently employed, the employee must make application for extension of the benefit
period, in writing, not later than five days following the
date of such idleness.
Conditions to Effectiveness of the Plan - Special rulings
were needed to allow tax deduction for company contributions
to the fund, and allow integration of the benefits with state
unemployment benefits,
by the company.

Both of these rulings were obtained

CHAP1'ER IV

THE PLAN IN OPERATION
That the author might study the plan in its actual operation, three approaches were opened to him.

The plan and its

operation could have been studied through the management and
its records, through the union and its officials or through
the workers and their experience.

Each method offered limita-

tions and advantages but because the purpose of the study was
to determine the effect of the plan on the workers involved,
it was decided to attach the most weight to the workers'
actual experience.
Between the period of November 1, 1954 and November 30,

1956, the date on which the Rice-Stix officials negotiated the
new Income Security Plan (S. U.B.) with the Teamsters, attrition
and voluntary "quits" had reduced the work force to 313 workers.

The 102 workers who left the company even when included

under the guarantee did so because they were keenly aware of
the uncertain position of the Company and therefore were anxious
to secure steady employment elsewhere.

Attrition played an i .

portant role in reducing the number of workers to 313 since
each worker remaining constituted a liability to management
and each worker Who "voluntarily" quit was not, of course,
4lt

eligible under the plan.
There were two sources from which individual information
concerning these workers was obtained.

The first source was

willingly supplied by the Company officials from personnel
records.

These records furnished information concerning the

worker's age, job classification, education and duration of
layoff.

Although there was an occasional omission of one or

the other of the above-mentioned categories, demographic information on all 316 workers is complete.

The second source

of information was obtained by questionnaire, but the coverage
was not as universal as that obtained from the personnel
records.
Response to the questionnaire was received from 180 of
the covered workers.
total covered workers.

This amounted to ,6.6 percent of the 31:3
The response to this questionnaire was

divided by mail response and response to personal interview.
Mail response yielded 49 returns while personal interview
yielded the remaining 131 returns.

The main purpose of the

questionnaire was to obtain the opinion of the workers regarding the operation of the plan, though information such as duration of layoff and method of job-placement was also sought.
The need for the latter information arose because this type
of information was somewhat incomplete on the personnel cards.

~6

I.

Personnel Demography

A.

Age
The average age of the 318 eligible employees was

years.

~7.~

This is relatively high when compared with the national

average age of wholesale warehousing personnel which the Bureau
of Census places at

~O.l

years for male personnel and

years for female personnel. 56

35.~

The explanation for the high

average age at Rice-Stix was due generally to a natural decline
in the wholesale warehousing industry and specifically to RiceStix's unwillingness to introduce technological improvements.
Such a condition offered neither challenge or future prospects
of advancement for young workers seeking a career.

Older work-

ers, on the other hand, cannot be so independent, for a fair
job opportunity varies inversely with age.
TABLE I

NUMBER OF WORKERS BY SEX AND AGE

Sex

Age
Under 25

25-3lf 35-44

~5-54

Male

5

10

36

38

Female

5

29

53

66

Source:

55-6~

39
23

65 and Over
5
1

Rice-Stix Personnel Records

56U. S. Bureau of Census, Q. §. Census of Popuation: 122Q,

The male workers at Rice-Stix had an average age of 49.6
years.

This age represents a 9.5 year increase above the aver-

age age for male personnel in the industry on a national scale.
Only 18 of the 141 male employees were claSSified as clerical
personnel, the other 123 were semi-skilled operatives.
TABLE Ia

JOB CLASSIFICATION BY SEX AND AGE GRODPS
Age Groups
Sex

Under
25

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65 and
Over

Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr
Male

5

0

12

6

30

6

32

6

37

2

5

0

Female

1

4

4

25

13

40

15

51

0

23

0

1

Source:

Rice-Stix Personnel Records.

1'he age of female workers did not offer as seriolls an obstacle
to finding new jobs as it did to male workers.

Clerical work-

ers composed 81.3 percent of the total female labor force at
Rice-Stix, while the average age of all female personnel was
46.5 years--2.1 years below that of male personnel.

In

Vol. IV Special Re~orts, Part 1 Chapter D, Industrial Characteristics CU. S.overnment Printing Office, Washington,
D. C., 1955).

addition to the advantage of age, the demand for clerical personnel in St. Louis was good according to the Company and State
employment offices.

Also, 37.5 percent of all female personnel

were concentrated in the 45-54 age group and some decided, for
various personal reasons, to leave the labor force entirely
when laid off.
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBQ"'I'ION OF WORKERS

BY AGE GROUPS
==

Age Groups

Male

Female

Total

Jnder 25

3.5
12.8

2.8
16.4

25.427.0

29.9

3·2
14-.8
28.0
32.7
194-

25-34
35-444-5-54
55-64

27.7

37.3
13, I)

65 and over

3.5

.6

1.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total
Source:
B.

Rice-Stix Personnel Records.

Length of Service
The average length of service at Rice-Stix reached 12.4-

years for all workers.

The male workers averaged a longer job

tenure with a service of 13.5 years as compared with 11.2 for
female employees.
TABLE III
YEARS OF

SENIORITY BY SEX AND AGE
=

Female

Male

Age Groups
0-5

6-10

16-

0-5

6-10

2

3

0

0

4

1

0

0

25-34

3

9

5

1

9

12

<3

0

35-44

4

8

11

13

11

14

24

4

45-54

4

5

10

17

7

7

32

20

55-64

4

5

13

17

3

2

9

9

65 and over

0

0

2

3

0

0

1

0

~Jnder

25

Source:

11-15

11-15

16---

Rice-Stix Personnel Records.

Table IV illustrates the percentage distribution of
service among male as compared to female workers.

In a study

on the characteristics of older workers by the Bureau of Employment Security, it was found that older workers were more
stable and held jobs longer than younger workers. 57 More than
57Bureau of Employment Security, Characteristics and Work
Experience of Older Unemployed ~orkers (November 1, 195b),---p.

19.

TABLE IV
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS
BY YEARS OF SENIORITY

Years of
Seniority

Male

Female

Total

0-5

12.1

19.2

16.0

6-10

21.3

20.3

20.d

11-15

29.1

4.1.8

36.2

16 and over

37.5

1B.7

27.0

Total

100.0

10:).0

100.0

Source:

Rice-Stix Personnel Records.

one-half of the older job-seekers had held only one job for the
past 3 years, compared with one-third of those under 4.5 years
of age.

Thus the average age of 47.5 years and the average

length of service of 12.4 years does not represent an unusual
correlation.
C.

Educa tiQI!
The amount of formal edacation received by the Rice-

St1x personnel 1s 1ndicated 1n Table V.
Only one in five of the older workers interviewed in the
.
sample had completed h1gh school, compared w1th one in three
of the younger workers employed.

At Rice-Stix only one in 9

~l

of the older male workers had completed high school, compared
with one in eight of the female personnel.
TABLE V
ED:JCATION OF WORKERS BY SEX AND AGE

Male
Age Groups

G.S.

Part
H.S.

Female

H.S.

Part
Col.

G.S.

Part
H.S.

H.S.

Part
CoL

flnder 2,

1

3

1

0

0

1

4

0

25-34
35-44

2

11

4

1

1

8

18

1

9

1,

9

3

16

1,

4

45-~

18

10

1

27

7

7

55-64

29
4

3

5
2

15
20

1

7

8

2

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

65 and over
Source:

Rice-Stix Personnel Records.

The majority of the male personnel were limited to a grade
school education while the largest proportion of the female
personnel were limited to a partial high school education.

The

placement of the laid-off worker at Rice-Stix was a formidable
task then due to the average age (47.5 years) and the educational background of its personnel_

TABLE VI
PERCENTAGE DISTRIB"JTION OF WORKERS
PER EDUCATION CATEGORY

G.S.
Part H.S.
H.S.

Total

D.

Female

Total

47.4

25.3

34.5

31.6

40.3
26.4

36.1

d.o

6.5

100.0

100.0

16·5
4.5

Part Col,

Source:

Male

100.0

22.9

Rice-Stix Personnel Records.

Duration of Unemployment
Information concerning the duration of unemployment

for all Rice-Stix personnel covered by the plan was not avaIlable.

Of the 141 male personnel information could be obtained

for only 92, and of the 177 female personnel information was
forthcoming on only 138.

Table VIr represents the numerical

distribution of male and female personnel upon whom durationof-unemployment information was available through Company
records and questionnaire returns.

Rice-Stix personnel cards

offered 68.6 percent of the information on the 92 male employees while the remaining 34.4 percent was processed from the
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questionnaire used in the study.

The Company records afforded

61.d percent of the information on the 138 female employees
while the remaining 38,2 percent was obtained from the questionnaire.
TABLE VIr
DURATION OF LAYOFF BY AGE AND SEX

Duration of
Layoff

Male

Female
0- 3lt yrs.

o-3lt yrs.

35-

0 under 1 mo.

7

9

13

41

1 under 3 mos.

5

23

3

27

3 mos. and over

It

25

2

28

6

9

3

18

0

3

0

3

(Disqualified
n. a. (
(Pension
Source:

35-

Questionnaire.

Only 210 of the 318 eligible employees utilized either
the benefits or the placement service administered by RiceStlx during the life of the program.

Many employees either

found jobs immediately on their own initiative or would not be
bothered with the requirements which were set up to establish
worker eligibility under the SUB program.

There would be no

records available on these employees once they had terminated
their employment with the company.

The "n.a." heading was
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included in Table VII to account for disqualified and pensIoned
personnel, to show the reason for their unavailability.
The thorough studies on older workers by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics over the past few years have pointed up some
dangerous trends in hiring policy.

With the dynamic popula-

tion trends taking place in the United States today, there
will have to be a serious reappraisal of hiring policies of
older workers or these workers will become wards of the state.
In 1900,
million,
By 1955,
million,

persons between 45 and 64 numbered nearly lOt
or about 14 percent of the total population.
this age group had increased to nearly 33!
about one-fifth of the total population. 5

The repercussions of these profound changes in population
trends must necessarily have their effects on employment trends
in the U. S.

With the steadily increasing life span59 must come

a steadily increasing utilization of older workers.
However, many problems both real and imaginary have retarded the effective utilization of these older workers.

Such

imaginary problems as gross exaggeration of older worker's inability to adapt to new jobs, excessive sickness, absenteeism,
and lack of dexterity and aggressiveness have been alleged.

58U• S. Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 1213, p. 1.
59Ibid., P. 31.

The average length of life in the U. S.

reached~6 years by 19542 and increase of over 22 years

since 1900. The average l1fe expectancy is now 73.6 years for
women and more than 67 years for men.
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Some real problems do exist such as lack of formal education,
geographical immobility and social inadaptability.
Male workers over 45 years of age at Rice-Stix had a difficult time securing employment in the first month after layoff due to the fact that St. Louis was a "labor surplus" area
early in 1957.

The St. Louis Labor Market, a publication of

the Missouri Division of Employment Security reported that 4.7
percent of the total labor force in St. Louis as unemployed in
January 1957 and by ,February 1958 the percentage rose to 8.8
percent.

However, Table VIII shows that a high percentage of

the workers at Rice-Stix obtained jobs during the first two
months of lay-off.

This is due in part undoubtedly to the
TABLE VIII

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DURATION
OF LAYOFF

Male

Female

Total

0 under 1

17.6

39.1

30.6

1 under 3

30.8

21. 7

25.3

3 and over

31.9
16.4

21. 7

25.8

15.2

15.7

3.3

2.3

2.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

Month

Dis qualified
Pension
Total
Source:

Questionnaire
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strong pressure exerted by the Rice-Sttx placement service.
To cut costs the worker was forced to accept the earliest job
offered, even though it may have been most undesirable.

De-

spite these efforts 39.6 percent of the older workers in the
male category remained unemployed after three months.
the average age of

~9.6

With

years for Rice-Stix male personnel,

their lack of formal education and the poor condition of the
St. Louis labor market it is surpriSing that so many older
workers did eventually find jobs, even with the placement
pressures of the Company employment service,
Women personnel fared better than men in securing employment rapidly.

Of the women workers over

~5

years of age, 37.9

percent obtained jobs within one month of layoff, as compared
with only 15.9 percent for the men.

The reasons for this re-

sult are the advantages that the women held in the important
categories of age, occupation and education.
Despite the extenuating circumstances lessening the duration of unemployment for specific types of workers at Ricesttx, once unemployed the older workers experienced greater
difficulty finding another job.
II.

Method of Job Placement
By

the terms of the Amending Agreement of November 30,

1956 employees were assigned to three agencies for job placement.

The initial job referral was with the Missouri State
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Placement service to which the employee had to report weekly.
In addition to the State service, the Rice-Stix dis chargee had
to report to and accept job referrals deemed suitable by the
Union and/or the Rice-Stix placement services.
TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOR~ERS
BY METHOD OF PLACEMENT

=
Method of
Placement

=;

:

Male

Female

Total

State

10.8

12.2

11. 7

Union

1.5

4.1

3.1

Company

36.9

22.5

28.2

Own efforts

50.8

61.2

57.0

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source:

--

Questionnaire.

Information on the method of job placement could only be
obtained by means of the questionnaire.

The Company personnel

records, although having fairly adequate information as to
where their employees found jobs, did not distinguish among
the three services as to which had supplied the job lead.
means of the questionnaire the method of placement was able
to be determined for 163 of the 318 covered employees.

By

Of the 138 respondents to the Job-placement question in
the questionnaire, 6, were male and 9d were female respondents.
Of the 6, male employees who secured employment, ,0.8 percent
said it was through their own efforts; 61.3 of the 98 female
personnel also used the same personal initiative.

The Company

placement service secured jobs for 36.9 percent of men, whereas
the M1ssouri State and Union placement services placed only 12.3
of all male respondents.

However, the Company serv1ce was not

as successful in placing female disehargees in new Jobs, for
it placed only 22.2 percent of the female respondents as compared with 36.9 percent for males.
Most of the laid-off workers found jobs through their own
efforts.

By doing so they were able to select jobs that were

more to their liking than. a
the employment agenoies.

II

suitable" job referral of one of

It also brings out the tenet that

most workers prefer not to be dependent upon any kind of
economic seourity program, if of course, they can avoid it.
Of the three employment servioes, the company, state and
union in that order, placed the largest number of workers.
The company placement service was the most successful for
various reasons.

Their primary motivating force was cost,

Each worker that they were able to place saved them money
regardless of whether the job was temporary or permanent and
whether the job was particularly suitable to the individual or

,9
not.

In addition the company required the greatest minimum

number of Job referrals for employee per week--five.

The State

service required only three and the union service could not be
held to a specific number since the number of job referrals
available to it was sporadic and undeterminable.

The company

also contracted independent employment services throughout the
city which helped to find work for the laid off employees.
They also added an employee to their staff whose sole duty it
was to locate job opportunities in the area.

In addition the

company had the most efficient method of checking whether or
not the applicant actually sought the job in question and the
manner in which he sought it.
The state employment service was somewhat limited because
of its equal obligation to all laid off workers in the city
which for a portion of the time in question was declared to be
a labor surplus area.

For various reasons the state system

was not as efficient as the company in follow-up procedures to
determine if, and the manner in which, an individual applicant
applied for a specific job.

The State did not do as well in

placing older workers as might have been expected,

Many older

workers were quick to state that they had to sit and wait most
of the day for job referrals while younger workers passed them,
The union was at a special disadvantage with regard to
placement of workers first because its number of referrals was
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limited to only those firms who were organized by the Teamsters
union and among these only those who sought the union's help
in finding workers, and second because the union, like the
state service, had an obligation to unemployed workers other
than those who had been employed by Rice-Stix.
Even though 25.8 percent of workers were unemployed three
months or longer two important pOints can be witnessed: (1) the
duration of unemployment for the workers was certainly reduced
because of the plan and (2) the incidence of malingering was
negligible.

One important classification of unemployment is

"frictional unemployment" or the type of unemployment which
occurs when jobs are available but the worker and/or the
employer are unable to align themselves with the job opportunity at the proper time.

It is only reasonable then that

with three services, one of which is motivated by a constant
cost factor, working together to

~lign

wcrkers with jobs and

vice-versa, the placement success will be greatly enbanced.
By company statement the number of malingerers did not exceed
four.

The difficulty of malingering is immediately obvious

when one recalls that an applicant must have been available
for work and accept from ten to fifteen job referrals a week
to remain eligible under the plan
F.

Disqualifications
The Disqualification Table

incl~des

not only those who
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were disqualified for some alleged abuse of the SUB regulations, but also those who were individually sought-out for jobS,
and on refusal to accept, were termed "unavailable" for work,
This inclusion partially explains the high number of disqualifications in the female

~5-~

age group,

Some of the female

workers decided, you will recall from an early discussion, to
leave the labor force entirely when laid-off.

Others did not

make this decision known until a job had been offered to them
and thus drew benefits until that time.
TABLE X

DISQUALIFICATION BY AGE AND SEX
Age
Sex

TJnder 25 25-3~ 35-4~ 45-54 55-64 65 and over

Male

1

5

5

2

1

1

Female

1

2

6

10

2

0

Source:

Questionnaire.

There was a total of 36 disqualification from the RiceStix SUB plan--2l for women and 15 for men.

Sixty-six and

seven-tenths percent of the disqualified male personnel was
concentrated in the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups.

On the other

hand, 76.2 percent of the disqualified female personnel belonged in the 35-44 and

~5-5~

age group.

Of this concentra-

r-----------.
.
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tion
the

~7.6

45-~

percent of the female workers disqualified were in
age group itself.
TABLE XI
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DISQUALIFIED

BY AGE

Age

Male

Female

Total

Under 25

6.7

4.8

,.6

25-34

33.3

9"

19,4

35-44

28 6

30.6

47.6

55-6i+

33.3
13.3
6.7

65 and over

6.7

9.5
0

33.3
8.4

100.0

100.0

~5-5l+

Total
Source:

2.7
100.0

Questionnaire.

Of the persons disqualified under the Plan, the vast
majority were either not "available" for work or refused to
accept tlsuitable" work.

Both of these terms are subject to

administrational flat, and even state employment services with
all their experience have had a difficult time in setting
objective standards.

The difficult nature of this decision is

attested to by an expert analyst of unemployment compensation

63
abuses.
Hard as it is to make that distinction among working
violators, is doubly hard in the case of non-working
violators. The state of being "not enough of a worker"
is extremely complex, The agency finds it hard to state
clearly even for itself what it means by such requirements as that the claimant should have "good cause" for
leaving a job, or that he should be "available" for work.
The agency finds t still harder to convey the meaning
to the claimant. 60
The same author judges a state employment service to be
practicing a "severe disqualification policyt! in the following
example:
Claimant a woman, referred to a job on night shift in
plant with inadequate night public transportation and
in unsafe neighborhood. Was disqualified for refusal to
work for which reasonably fitted. Claimant testified
and examiner agreed that company would not hire her
because of lack of safe transportation for night shift
workers. Subsequent to job referral, employer amended
order to eliminate referral of women workers to shift at
night unless private transportation available. The
situation was well known to examine and therefore presumably to ES (employment service). 6l
By this same standard in an illustration amazingly similar to
the one above, Rice-Stix could be judged "severe" in its disqualification criterion.

A certain woman in the mean age group

of 45-54 years, who had no personal means of transportation,
was disqualified for not accepting a position with a firm

60JoSePh M. Becker, The Problem of Abuse in Unemployment
Benefits (New York: Columbia ITniverslty Press, '9;3), p, 207.

61 Ibid., p. 345

r.....-----------.
6lt-

located approximately 17 miles from her home,

Rice-Stix

having disqualified her, called upon the state service to do
the same.

The state disqualified her but she applied to the

State arbitration board for a hearing and was consequently
reinstated with back cheeks,

It is worth noting here that

arbitration was provided by the state and not the arbitration
prooedure of the Plan.

She applied for the state arbitration

first because under the plan the state was to set the standard
as to the term "availability."

Had the state rejected her

plea for reinstatement she could have then invoked the arbitration proceedings under Art. VIII, Sec. 4 of the Plan,
Such things as length of service, duration of unemployment, distance of the Job from home, local Job market prospects,
etc., enter into the administrative decisions as to tlavailability" and "suitability."

These decisions 'Were anything but

liberal to the unemployment worker under the guarantee since
unemployment in the city was high and job opportunities were
very limited.
However, beneath these poor area conditions the primary
cause for exercising severe "suitability" and "availability"
criteria finds its origin ultimately in cost factors.

Rice-

Stix officials 'Were annoyed by the hard line pursued by the
Teamsters in demanding unmitigated compliance with the supplemental pay plan when the permanent layoff situation clearly

r
called tor severance pay.
The number ot disqualifications was actually quite low,
and this was due in major part to the policy of attrition and
voluntary "quits U followed by the administrators of the Plan.
Waiting periods for benefits were excessively long, job referrals were unreasonably numerous, and courtesy was deSignedly
lacking.
Although the Plan called for a three-man Board of Arbitration represented by the union, management and public in the
case of disagreement over disqualifications, this Board was
never convened.

Considering the "severe" disqualification

criteria it is doubly strange that this Board was never petitioned.

Some workers did voice their disapproval to the Team-

sters, but there is no evidence that the Board was ever petitioned to arbitrate.

This point will be discussed more fully

in a later section.
III.

Opinions ot Workers toward Different
Aspects ot the Plan
A.

!2ward ill!. of dismissal

~

By way of the questionnaire 162 workers expressed a
preference for either supplementary unemployment benefits or
severance pay.

This choice was split evenly 81 for supple-

mental pay and dl for severance pay.
The company had offered a standard severance pay plan in
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lieu of the SUB; one wealt f s pay tor every year of service up
to five years, then a graduated scale of
each following year of service.

80

many days' pay for

The question of SUB and

severance pay did not come to an actual membership vote, but
was decided 1n union committee at the time of negotiations.
The workers de facto fared better by the SUB than they would
have by a severance pay plan but the latter, according to the
company officials, would have distributed the monies more
equitably since it was based on length of service rather than
duration of layoff.

Male employees preferred SUB to severance
TABLE XII

WORKERS' PREFERENCE TOWARD TYPE OF DISMISSAL
PAY BY SEX AND LENGTH OF SERVICE

Type of
Dismissal
0-5
Pay
yrs.

Male

Female

6-10
yrs.

11-15
yrs.

16-

yrs.

0-5

6-10
yrs,

11-15
yrs.

16-

S.J.B.

5

9

12

13

2

10

22

8

Severance

3

7

7

8

9

6

27

14

Source:

Questionnaire.

pay--39 for the former and 25 for the latter.
were more inclined toward severance pay, with

Female employees

56 choosing

severance pay and 42 supplemental pay.
For every seniority group the male respondents preferred

r
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supplemental pay to severanoe pay_

A progressively greater

peroentage of all male respondents preferred the supplemental
pay as their length of servioe and, consequently, their age
inoreased.

Not only was the percentage of supplemental over

severanoe pay greater in every length-of-service category for
male employees, but also the peroentage variation inoreased as
the worker's length of servioe inoreased.
This preferenoe for SUB over severanoe pay by male workers
is perfeotly aligned with the seourity aspect of guaranteed pay
plans.

Male workers by natural status have stronger job attach-

ments than women.

As they grow older the demand for their

services varies inversely, while their need for wage seourity
continues.

Consequently, they have a stronger predileotion

for that economic security devioe which most closely approximates their weekly or bi-weekly inoome.
This tendenoy of male workers was brought out distinotly
duringtbe interviews.

Many workers did not know what sever-

ance pay meant, but when the distinotion had been made for
them between SUB and severance pay the older worker, especially the males, invariably ohose SUB.

They were habituated

to reoeiving a stipulated wage periodioally and knew enough
about economic conditions and anxieties during periods of
unemployment to realize that SUB would better serve their
position once they were laid-off.

Many expressed the fear of

r
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squandering a lump-sum severance pay before a new job could be
secured.
In opposition to male respondents female workers preferred severance pay to SUB.

The 6 to 10 year length-of-

service category was the only exception to this trend for female employees.

In this group 10.2 percent manifested a pref-

erence for severance pay_

The female respondents, although

having a definite preterence for severance pay over supplemental pay--57.0 percent for severance pay and

~3.0

percent

for supplemental pay, did not assert their preference as
strongly as did the male respondents--60.9 percent for supplemental pay and 39.1 percent for severance pay.
The predilection ot female workers in the Rice-Stix situation tor severance pay is also a normal pattern.
because of marital obligation, age (mean age
education (only

l6.~

~9.6

The men,
years), and

percent had completed high school), needed

the "social" security of the SUB, whereas the women could
aftord to be more independent.

The female personnel, who were

more free of familial economio obligations, had a mean age of
46.5 years and

28.~

percent had completed high school.

Also,

81.1 percent of all female workers possessed clerical Skills,
for which there was an increasing demand as compared with male
warehousing operatives, who were less in demand due to the
decline of the industry.

Numerically the work force was almost perfectly split on
the question.

Those quickly placed of course preferred sever-

ance pay and also those who felt that the pressure of job referrals Was too severe.
preferred

SUB,

Those who were unable to locate work

These are, however, decisions made in retro-

spect and as such do not lend themselves to generalization.
Given a slightly different set of circumstances, the individual worker's preference may have changed radically.
On the basis of the study and the conflicting attitude
brought out by the question, the work force at Rice-Stix probably would have preferred a plan similar to the SUB plan of
the Pittsburgh Glass Company.

The Glass plan is really not an

unemployment insurance plan as was the Income Security plan at
Rice-Stix.

The Glass plan is rather a deferred savings plan
with vested rights. 62 The plan provided for a minimum security
account of $600 per employee, but once this amount is reached,
in-payments do not stop; rather they are earmarked for distribution as vacation pay extras.

Up to $600 of the individual

fund may be used to pay benefits due to lay-off or prolonged
illness.

Each employee retains a vested right to his security

fund, which he will receive in a lump-sum if he quits, is dismissed or retires.
62Turnbull et al., Economic and Social Securitz, p. 231.

r
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Such a plan would have placated most of the major complaints of the Rice-Stix employees.

It would retain some

relationship of benefits to length-of-service yet afford a
degree of protection for the individual employee from the
economic insecurity due to either temporary or permanent layoff.
IV.

Workers' Opinion of Administration of the Plan
In reply to the oplnion-toward-administration question,

165 Rice-Stix workers expressed a response,

Of this number

99 were female and 66 were males.
'lIABLE XIII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS' OPINION
OF ADMINISTRATION OF S.U.B.
ia

Male

Female

Total

Favorable

59.1

58.6

,3.8

Favorable with reservations

22.7

25,3

24-.2

Unfavorable

9.1

9.1

9.1

No answer

9.1

7·0

7.9

100.0

100 . 0

100.0

Opinion

Total
Source:

Questionnaire.
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The wide variety of expression which this question precipitated made it difficult to process the responses under
general categories without losing objectivity_

After careful

study of the responses to the questionnaire the four categories
listed in Table XIII were thought to be the best for expressing the worker's true opinion toward the administration of the
SUB plan.

The category "favorable with reservations," was

adopted to cover an opinion in whioh the employee was generally
favorable to the plan but explicitly mentioned a complaint
which particularly impressed him or her.

The category Itno

answer tt was deemed necessary to cover those employees who explicitly refused to make a judgment concerning the plan or its
administration.

The category, uUnf'avorable tf included those

respondents who expressed with varying degrees of emphasis
both their general and particular dislike of the plan.
The "favorable u category included 53.8 percent of all
respondents.

While the SryB plan was still in effect, prior to

February 28, 195d, no questionnaire was given to the eligible
Rice-Stix personnel for fear that their response would be
biased.

If the respondent thought that his answer expressing

an unfavorable opinion toward the Plan and its administration
would have jeopardized his eligibility, he would have answered
under duress.

To avoid this possibility the questionnaire was

run-off only after an employee had exhausted his benefits or,

r

72

where this was impossible to be certain of, after the expiration date of the plan in February, 19,a.
i'he 66 male respondents expressed a ,9.1 percent "favorable" opinion response towards the administration of the SUB
plan.

The female respondents, however, were slight11 below

the males in their "favorable" opinion with 5'8.6 percent.

This

is typical when Table XIII is compared with Table XII, because
the male respondents expressed 60.9 percent preference for SUB
over severance pay, while female respondents on the other hand
expressed '7.2 percent for severance pay over SUE.
In the "favorable with reservation" category the female
respondents had more complaints with the administration than
did the male respondents.

Twenty-five and two-tenths percent

of the female respondents explicitly mentioned a complaint
while 22.7 percent of the males were explicit.
The largest single group of workers expressed a favorable
opinion toward the administration of the plan yet some of
these found a job in a very short period of time and thus did
not have much experience under the plan.

The second largest

group were those expressing a "favorable with reservation"
opinion.

The most reiterated complaint was delivered against

the personnel man brought in for the express purpose of placing the dischargees expeditiously and cheaply.

This individual

was referred to as a "hatchet man," which, abstracting from
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his personality and concentrating on his duties, he was in
many ways.

Many and varied reasons tor disliking the admin-

istration follow upon this principal complaint,

Some telt

that they should not have to report in person each week for
benef1ts but that their cheeks should have been mailed to them
each week.

Others felt that they had to wait too long at in-

convenient reporting times; that 10 to

l~

job referrals a week

was excessive since many of these were unreasonable leads; that
applicants were treated like ttcharity cases"; and that it was
unfair to require those with jobs to report in person each
week
One individual observed that a company could pay a former
Rice-Stix employee a lower wage knowing that Rlce-Stix would
supplement it.

Others contended that continued membership in

the Teamster's Union made it difficult to obtain work with
some prospective employers.
In general, the "favorable with reservations" and "un_
favorable" categories were the result of two oppOSing views
meeting head-on.

The worker desired benefits and interpreted

the plan in such a way as to best accomplish this goal.

The

Company desired to cut the cost of the plan and thus administered it in such a way as to do just that whenever possible.
The Company, making it difficult to collect benefits, sought
to reduce cost via attrition.
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There was a general lack of mutual trust between the
workers and the administrators of the Stffi plan at Rice-Stix.
The administration failed to realize that the vast majority of
workers were earnestly seeking a good job and not merely living
off the 100 percent guarantee provided by the contrnct.

Some

workers, on the other hand, failed to realize that the plan
was a device for insuring a steady income during job-seeking
and not a one-year vacation plan.
Considering the adaptation which was necessary to administer a severance situation by means of a SUB administrative
procedure, the best placement results were probably obtained
by the Rice-Stix placement agency_

v.

Cost of the SUB
The total possible cost of the original GAW was certainly

known to the Company.

It was simply the average hourly wage

times 2,080 hours times the number of covered employees.

The

actual cost of a G.A.W. plan is always an unknown in actual
monetary figures at the time of negotiations.

The key to

future proliferation of the guaranteed annual wage plan-whether in the form of SUB or GAW--depends on setting specific
limitations to an employer's liability

The Latimer Report is

quick to realize this fact in its summary remarks.
The experience with g~aranteed wage plans has not
afforded any substantial evidence as to what a plan
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with specified provisions might cost over a period of
time. An employer who guarantees wages undertakes an
obligation to pay the amount guaranteed regardless of
whether he has enough work to cover the guarantee. A
guarantee is self-defeating if it involves an employer
in additional costs to the point where his ability to
pay becomes unduly limited,03
Any form of guaranteed wage plan will, to the extent
toward which an employer commits himself, have compensating
benefits.

First, it should reduce labor turnover and there-

fore the cost of hiring and training new workers.

Secondly,

higher productivity would probably result from the mere bouyancy effects of a greater degree of individual economic security.

Thirdly, the cost of stabilizing labor requirements

could possibly be reduced.

The Report concludes that these

factors will surely decrease the absolute cost ot wage guarantees assumed by employers.
This cost consideration of GAW obligations was certainly
thought of when the Rice-Stix management assumed the responsibility in 1953.

It must be remembered that the 'I'eamsters

included the GAW in their five-year contracts for the purpose
of giving their members a minimum of security in an unstable
industry.

However, the salutary effects of employment security

and increased productivity were relegated to the background
once the R1ce-Stix operation became the bait for the proxy

63 Latimer, 22. 9+ t ., p. 13,
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fight.

The new owners were not interested in stable working

conditions, but merely in utilizing the lucrative facets of
Rice-Stix and discontinuing the rest of the operation

The

decision to liquidate the warehousing operation presented only
one cost problem pertinent to the GAW--how can the contractual
obligation be discharged at the least expense to the owners?
Due to the Teamster's refusal to accept severance pay,
the owners were forced to discharge their obligation over a
61 week period.

Actual benefits to workers amounted to

$238,092.1, over this period with $77,391.38 added for pension
and health plan benefits.

(See Appendix D.)

This cost was a

considerable liability, but there was no record of management
re1uctanoe to aooept the obligation in 1953.

Onoe the provi-

sion of the oontract was in foree, concession to or mitigation
of the Company's liability was entirely at the Union's discretion.

Almost certainly the Union's choice of SUB over a

lump-sum severance plan increased the actual labor cost of the
new owners in their liquidation of the St. Louis warehousing
operation of Rice-Stix.

CHAPTEH V
CONCLUSION
Since Walter Ruether and the United Automobile Workers
negotiated their Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Plan in
19", a torrent of argumentation and discussion has appeared
from management and union sources as well as from ttneutrals. n
It has been charged that these plans create a duplicate unemployment system, that they reduce worker incentive, reduce
labor mobility and create unbearable financial burdens especially for the average and small sized firm.
had their problems with the SUB.

Unions also have

Primary among their problems

have been the senior union member who would prefer to have the
extra money in his pay envelope rather than in an SUB fund
which he feels is set-up primarily to aid employees with less
seniority.
This Rice-Stix study alone does not lend itself to conclusive answers to any of the above problems even though it is
more applicable to some than to others.

The study was de-

signed to determine the effect of this particular SUB plan on
a specific group of workers in a certain situation of permanent lay-ofr

As such the observations and conclusions reflect

a specific study with a specific set of circumstances and thus
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will be validly applied to future plans only if the future
circumstances are comparable.
The important conclusions may be brought out by examining
the pivotal parts of the plan in the light of the expressed
view of the worker and the statistical data compiled.
'I'ri-Partite Placement of Workers - This feature of the
plan did not represent a wasteful duplication of administration and resources as has been charged but rather a much needed
supplementation.

Rice-St1x's workers found jobs that would

not have been listed with the State Employment Service and they
found jobs relatively fast when it is recalled that the area
was declared a "labor surplus" area.
The important claSSification of frictional unemployment
was lessened through the efforts of the three agencies working
together aligning workers with employers and vice-versa more
quickly than would have been the case'had the State service
been working alone.
Malingering - Critics of the SUB early declared that such
plans would destroy the workers' incentive:

"If I can collect

100 percent benefits while idle why should I seek work at all
during the period of the guarantee?"
It is here that We think this study has a definite contribution to make.

Up to this point the question has been mostly

academic since there has been no real evidence to substantiate
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one view or the other.
In the Rice-Stix situation the incidence of malingering
was negligible.

As was pointed out earlier, Company admin-

istrators of the plan declared that not more than four cases
of malingering could be found.

Another important point was

also brought out earlier, namely, that the majority of the
workers found jobs through their own efforts.
The reasons for this record are many--the methods of the
Company and State services to thwart abuses and the fact expressed by the workers that they were better satisfied with
jobs that they personally seleoted.

But whatever the reasons

the fact remains that of all the workers inoluded in the
guarantee, only four were classified by the employer as
malingerers.
Cost of the SUB - When Rice-Stix negotiated the GAW in

19,3 covering

~20

of their employees there was little evidence

to lead them to believe that the guarantee would ever be used.
Later it was invoked and eventually the company did go out of
business.

On the basis of this study however, it can honestly

be said that the two events did not represent a cause-effect
relationship.

As was shown in Appendix B, the Company had the

ability to pay and the firm was liquidated by Safie Bros., in
spite of the cost of the SUB and liquidated at a sizeable
profit.
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Preference of SDB over Severance Pay - Probably because
of the lack of job-security in the industry and company with
which they were associated and the general conditions of the
St. Louis labor market, the majority of the workers, with an
average length of service of 12.4 years, preferred SUB to the
severance pay plan offered by the Company.
The situation in which this preference was aired can
hardly be called typical however, and as such, the preference
does not lend itself to generalization.
Summary - The increasing fear of job-insecurity which
grips the 20th century industrial worker is bound to increase
the importance of private plans to supplement unemployment
benefits"

Sweeping industry-wide decisions can arbitrarily

jeopardize the jobs of thousands. of workers, causing untold
misery to many more thousands of persons who directly dependent
upon the worker IS weel-cly pay oheck.
If the private approach to eoonomic security does not
keep pace with modern industrial ooncentration, the governmental
approach of unemployment compensation will have to be vastly
extended.

With the inherent fear of nSocialism" so strong in

the United States, the most natural solution to economic insecurity seems to rest in the private union-management approach,
The fundamental importance of private unemployment insuranoe
to our free society demands that all private institutions
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concerned work diligently to extend its application as widely
as possible.
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APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE PUNS
IN TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 CONTRACfS

Company or Industry
GrQUR

No. of
Area
of
Guaranteed
Emplys. Effective
Total
Total
Covered
Date of
Wage
Annual
<ltd. Emplys.
Plap
by
Plan
Houri in Unit
CavU.S,

Crown Cork Specialty

2,000

Brown Shoe Co.

2,000

233

1st 160 employees

160

3/1/53

385

11/15/52

on senior!t.y
roster

400

All employees on
payroll as of

n/l/52
Rice-Stix Dry Goods

2,000

660

1st 420 employees
on seni0X'1ty
roster

420

3/1/53

Wool Shoe Co.

2,000

114

ht 50% 01 employee. on seniority
roster

100

5/1/53

Cabinet Industry (6)

2,000

36

1st 50% of employees on seniority
roster

17

5/1/53

So-Good Potato Chip

2,000

14

1st 8 employees on
seniority roster

a

4/25/53

Puro Co.

2,000

100

35 employees
Jan. thru May
25 employees
June thru Aug.
15 employees
Sept. thru Dec.

85

5/6/53

36

Company or Industry
q,p,yp

No. of
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective
Gtd~ Emply".
AMual Wage
Covered Date of
Hqyts 10 Unit
COYlt'ge
bX Phn Pl'n

NOtthwestern Cooperage

2,000

60

Shapleigh Hardware Co.

2,000

869

Handl1fl9, Inc.

2,000

Kearney Electric

1st 35 employees
on seniority
toster

35

5/23/53

1It 6~ of employees on seniority
roster

531

6/1/~

20S

1st 130 employees
on seniority
roster

130

6/1/53

2,000

236

1st 140 employees
on seniority
roster

140

4/11/53

A. S. Aloe Co.

2,000

80

ht 6~ of employees on seniority
roster

54

10/1/53

Brooks Paper Co.

2,000

90

1st 5Q% of employees Oft senIority
roster

40

11/16/53

Bond Clothing Co.

2,000

35

N.aintenance of
basic crew of 2!J
employees

Breuchman Cooperage

2,000

6

Handland, Inc.

2,000

2

Drug-itaster

2,000

34

Act Haase (Pro.)

1,800

60

1st 50% of emp1oyeea on seniority
roster

2/27/52

3

11/26/57

1

5/1/54

1st 5<'* of employees on seniority
roster

17

5/1/54

lst 4qi6 of employees on seniOl'ity
roster.

24

7/ll'M>

-

------

---

07
Company or Industry
~QYP

No. of
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emply •• Effective
Covered Date of
Annual Wage
Gtd. Emplys.
Plan
by elln
S(QYerage
Hours in

unu

lst 25% of emplO1eea on seniority
roster

87

1/15/55

19

1st 10 employees
on seniority
roster

10

4/']!!)f5#,

2,000

14

1st 6 on seniority
roster

6

6/27/54

A & L Cigarette

2,000

5

lst 5 employees on
seniority roster

H. J. Heinz Co.

2,000

7

1st 4 employees on
seniority roster

4

11/14/53

Cold Storag. Whses.

2,000

126

1st 50% of employees on seniority
roster

63

9/15/M

Aaron ferer & Sons

2,000

17

1st 10 employees
on seniority
roster

10

8/22/54

Hutting Sash & Door

2,000

26

1st 14 employees
on seniority
roster

14

12/31/54

Buxton-Sklnner Co.

2,000

8

Professional Spec.

2,000

32

1st 17 employees
on seniority
roster

17

7/4/'J3

Public Warehouses (9)

2,000

170

1st 90 employees
on roster of 9
firms

200

9/1/53

American Metal Bar.

2,000

11

4

8/16/53

Fruit and Produce

2,000

350

Louis Maull Co.

2,000

Marthwest Bottle

5/24/54

1st 6at of emp1oyees on seniority
roster

1st 4 employees on
seniority roster

2/13/54

...,
ad
Company or Industry
GrQYP

No. of
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective
Covered Date of
Gtd, Emplys.
Annual Wage
by Plan Pli n
Ho,yrs 10 ynU
&cw;rage
lst 6~ of employeea on seniority
roster

60

6/1/55

17

lst 10 employees
on seniority
roster

10

9/15/53

2,000

52

1st 60% of employees on roster
(verbal)

31

5/31/53

Witte Hdwe. Co.

2,000

90

lit 6(U of emp1oy-

54

6/1/55

Hampton Elec.

2,000

5

3

9/20/53

A. J. Childs

2,000

17

11

4/1~3

Adam Hat Co.

2,000

7

All current employees on Nat'1.
agreement

7

12/31/52

Grocer Industry
(non-ass'o. firms)

2,000

25

1st bc:t' of employaes on seniority
roster

15

10/14/53

ACL Haase (whse.)

2,000

20

1st 60% of emp1oyees on seniority
roster

12

10/14/53

Heifetz Pickle Co.

2,000

30

1st 15 employees
on seniority
roster

15

11/1/54

Grocery Industry Assn.
(14)

2,000

390

1st 193 employees
on roster of 14
firms

193

10/14/53

Butler Bros.

2,000

100

American Sheet & Strip

2,000

Sears-Roebuck Co.

ees on seniority
roster
1st 3 employees on
seniority roster
lst 11 employees
on seniority
roster

Company or Industry
Group

No. of
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective
Gtd. Emplys.
Annual Wage
Covered Date of
HOUts in Unit
Cqxerage
by PIa a
Plan

Grocery Industry Office 2,000

140

1st 50% of employees on seniority
roster

70

10/14/53

APPENDIX II
BALANCE SHEET* - RICS-STIX, INC.
NOVEMBER 30, 1953

Current Assets
$ 2,030,872
Cash
Accounts Receivable
9,105,966
(net)
Inventorie,
19.:Z22.Q.Z;2
TUal eun@nt
$21,928,911
Asst:ta

CUrrent Llabi1itie,
Notes payable, hanks $ 4,500,000
Accounts payable
933,939
1,097,052
Accruals
Income tax reserve
~;a.Q2B
Total Cyfren,t
$ 6,624,019
LiabllUits

Qtblf Asse:tt

§baXlb21dlll' ~gW~:t¥
7% 1st preferred

Investments and
advances to subddt.ries, cost
Other investments

floeartX, Plan:t

par $100
7% 2nd preferred
par 1100
Common stock no par
Reserve general
conting.nciea
Earned aurplus

1,874,&0
444,691

~

IClUlipmtnt

Net property
IGB1 Aasets

2,01:),800

1,622,600
1,918,600
3,401,430
3,000,000
2t~:z.:a98

Iqt.l Li,bilitiea 126,264,247

$26,264,247

Net Income as a percentage of Capital Investment (including contingency reserves and earned surplus, but excluding income tax
reserves), of Riee-Stix, Inc. computed from Company to, records.**
1944 - 12.5
19<0 - 8.7
1946 - 19.5

1947 - 16.5
1948 - 12.5
1949 - 5.8
1953 1954 -

*

2.7
3.4

Standard and Poor, "QrPR,tiQD ReSCotdl.

** Rice-Stix financial records.
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19$0 -

8.8

1951 -

5.1

1~2

3.5

-

APPENDIX III

A RAIDER GETS ROUTED
(Fortune, October, 19,5, p. 177.)
One of the most colorful and complicated of recent raiding operations reached a startling denouement on August 26.
The raid was on Rice-Stix, Inc., of St. Louis, a big wholesaler and manufacturer of dresses, shirts, and other apparel,
and it really began back in 1953.

At that time textile oper-

ator M. M. Clairmont, with his tvo associates in Brandon Trading Corp., Adolph Marcus and Avram Goldstein, obtained control
of Reliance Manufacturing with an investment of some $3 million.
Using Reliance Funds, Clairmont began quietly buying up RiceStix common stock at $25 to $30 a share (VI. Rice-Bttx net
quick assets ot $51 a share).
When Clairmont had bought up about 50,000 of Rice-Stix's
227,000 shares of common, he made a tender offer of $42 a
share for 75,000 shares.

At this point in November,

19~,

Satie of Batie Bros., New York textile manufacturer, also
started buying Rice-Bttx shares.

Satie had been eyeing Rice-

Stlx for along time but had been told the controlling stockholders would not sell.

By mid-December. 1954, Safie had
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offered $50 a share and thought he had sewed up a 26,Ooo-share
block owned by E. W. Sttx, Sr., F. B. Eiseman (sons of two
original partners), and their immediate families,

But Clair-

mont was ahead of him and got the block for $46 a share.

The

same day Satie did pick up 30,000 shares for $50 a share.

In

the last ditoh try, on Naw Year's Eve, Satie telegraphed to
the Rice-Stix Board a $65-a-share offer for 72,000 treasury
shares.

The Board, not needing oapital and apparently fearing

legal entanglements, turned down the offer.
By February, 1955, Clairmont owned 52 percent at the
Rice~Stix

voting shares (the Rice-Stix 7 percent non-callable

preferred stock also had voting rights, and Safie and Clairmont bid its price up from $105 to $150).

Clairmont acquired

his oommon at an average price of $48 a share.
owned

~O

Safie, who

percent of the voting shares, acquired his common at

an average price ot $52 a

share~

Each man had put up about $7

million, but Clairmont had control.

There seemed no doubt

that Clairmont had won.
But Joe Safie never gave up trying.

He'd wanted Rice-

Stix for a long time; the company had a wonderful name in the
trade; he needed it as a domestic market for the textiles he
had his three brothers turned out in their North Carolina mill
(they also own mills in El Salvador and Trinidad),

He had

tried raiding and since that had failed he turned to negotia-
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tion.

The simplest way was to offer to buy out Clairmont's

majority interest in Rice-Stix, which he did, repeatedly.
Clairmont not only refused to sell but talked of trying to buy
out Safie's minority interest.
Safie turned back to the beginning of the whole complicated deal, back through Reliance to Brandon Trading, the holding company that controlled Reliance and therefore, in turn,
Rice-Stix.

He persuaded Clairmont's two chief associates in

Brandon Trading, Marcus and Goldstein, to work on Clairmont to
sell them his interest in Brandon.

Since his partners refused

to back him in buying Safie's minority interest, Clairmont
finally agreed to sellout to them.

It didn't take Marcus and

Goldstein long to turn around and sell Brandon. Trading to Safie
for $d million, which was more than double their original investment,

This of course, also gave the Safies control of

Reliance and Rice-Stix.
outlets they wanted.

So the Safies now have the textile

Mr. Clairmont is out of the textile

bUSiness, at least for the moment, but still in the chips.

APPENDIX IV
AMENDING AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 30th day of
November, 1956, by and between RICE-STIX, INC. (hereinafter
referred to as the Company) and the WAREHOUSE AND DISTRIBUTION
WORKERS' UNION, Local No. 688, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, A.F. of L., - C.I.C. (hereinafter referred
to as the Union).
WITNESSETH:
Whereas, the above parties have heretofore entered into a
collective bargaining agreement on March 20, 1953, and an
amending agreement dated June 27, 1956, covering the Company's
warehouse, maintenance and office employees in St. Louis,
Missouri, as defined in Article I of said agreement of March 20,

1953, as amended, and
Whereas, the above parties deem it necessary to make oertain changes 1n the said colleotive bargaining agreement of
March 20, 1953, as amended,
NOW THEREFORE, in oonsideration of the premises and
mutual promises herein oontained, the parties agree as follows:
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I.

Effective as of the date all details prerequisite to the
effectiveness of the following plan have been accomplished,
the said collective bargaining agreement of March 20, 1953, as
amended, shall be amended by striking therefrom Section 2 of
Article III ( titled "Guaranteed Annual Wage") and substituting
therefor the following torm of supplemental unemployment benefit program to be known as the Income Security Plan,
ARTICLE 1-

Establishment of Plan

The company shall establish, subject to the favorable
ruling of the Missouri DiviSion of Employment security, an
Income Security Plan for all of the hourly paid employees in
the bargaining unit as of the effective date of this Plan and
shall pay all expenses incident to the operation and management of the Plan for the duration of said collective bargaining
agreement of March 20, 1953, as amended, except as otherwise
provided in, and subject to the terms of this Plan.

The Pur-

pose of the Plan shall be to provide an Income Security Fund
from which
1.

An employee who is laid off or severed from the
Company's payroll for any reason beyond the employee's
control, except for failure or refusal of the employee
to work or tor discharge for cause or for military
leave, or for mutually agreed upon leave of absence,

96
or for reason of retirement, may draw from the fund
for a specified period, stipulated weekly amounts to
supplement State Unemployment Compensation benefits
or to supplement earnings from other employment which
are less than the employee's earnings received at time
of layoff.
ARTICLE II.

Eligibility

~

Participate

Each employee of the bargaining unit on the Company's payroll and on the seniority list as of the effective date of this
Plan shall be eligible to participate in the Plan.
ARTICLE III.

Inco!!! Security Fund

The Company shall establish an Income Security Fund in
accordance with this Income Security Plan and shall appoint a
Section 1.

trustee who shall be the Treasurer of the Compaoy, to carry out the provisions of this Plan.

All contributions by the Company for the eligible employees,
as set forth in Seetions 3 and

~,

the securities purchased

there with, and the earnings derived therefrom, shall be
credited to the Income Security Fund.
In the event that the Plan shall be terminated in accordance with its terms prior to the expiration of the above agreeSection 2.

ment or terminate with the said agreement, the
Company's obligation to contribute to the Fund

shall cease entirely.
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The moneys remaining in the Fund upon

termination of the Plan or the agreement, shall be paid to the
Unity Welfare Association Pension Trust Fund as defined in
Article XIV of said collective bargaining agreement ot March
20, 1953, as amended, and the Company's regular contribution
to said Unity Welfare Association Pension Trust Fund credited
for the amount so deposited.
For the purpose of this Section, failure to obtain the
favorable rulings re: the deductibility of the contributions
to the income Security Fund as a deductible expense under the
Internal Revenue Code as now in effect, or as may be hereafter
in effect or under any other applicable federal income tax law,
and a failure to obtain the favorable ruling of the Missouri
Division of Employment Security, shall be deemed to be a termination of the Plan.
The Company shall contribute to the Income Security Fund
effective with the dates shown below, a sum equal to the perSectlon 3.

centages as listed of the annual wages of those
hourly rated employees of the bargaining unit

employed as of the effective date of this Plan.
Amount

Dates of qontribution

l~

Effective date of plan

The contribution to said fund as of January 1, 1957 shall not
be less than a total of l~ of the annual wages of those hourly

rated employees of the bargaining unit employed as of the
effective date of this plan.

Subsequent contributions shall

be determined by actuarial valuation.
posited 1n a qualified bank.

Said fund shall be de-

Benefits shall be payable only

from such funds.
Investment of Income Security Fund.

(a) The moneys in

the Income Security Fund shall be invested in United states
Section 4.

Government Bonds or other equivalent securities
which are approved from the investment of trust

funds; (b) Earnings from the Income Security Fund shall be
oredited to the fund.
ARTICLE'±y.

Weekly Payments from IncoDl! §!9UX i tl Fund

An employee who is eligible under the plan shall be paid
for each week (as defined in the plan) during which the emSect10n 1.

ployee is unemployed, beginning with the third
week subsequent to the date of layoff and end-

ing with the 52nd week following date of lay-off, or the date
of termination of this plan, or the date of termination of the
collective bargaining agreement or any extension thereof,
whichever occurs earlier.
Amount of Applicant's Weekly Benefit:

(A) With respect to

each week for which an applicant receives or is entitled to
Section 2.

receive any unemployment compensation benefits,
the applicant Shall be paid a weekly benefit in
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an amount which when added to the applicant's state benefit
for such week, will be equal to 100% of the applicant's weekly
after-tax straight time pay, except as hereinafter adjusted.
For purposes of this subsection (a), an applicant's weekly
after-tax straight time pay shall be his regular gross weekly
wages reduced by the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal
taxes which would be required to be colleoted, deducted, or
withheld by the Company from the applicant's regular gross
weekly wages if regularly employed in the bargaining unit, (b)
with respect to those weeks for which the applicant laid is
not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits and such
ineligibility is not for reasons listed in Article V, Section
2 (a) of this plan, and provided the applicant shall have
registered for unemployment compensation benefits within five
(5) days following date of layoff, the applicant shall be paid

benefits from the Fund at the rate of the wages that he would
have received if he were to have remained at work, reduced by
the sum of all Federal, State, and Municipal taxes which would
be required to be collected, deducted or withheld by the Company from the applicant's regular gross weekly wages if regularly employed in the bargaining unit, (c) with respect to
each week for which an applioant receives a weekly wage from
an employer other than the Company, the applicant shall be
paid a weekly benefit which is equal to the difference between

100

the applicant's regular gross weekly wages received from the
Company , reduced by the sum of all Federal, state and . Municipal taxes which would be required to be collected, deducted or
withheld by the Company from the applicant's regular gross
weekly wages if regularly employed in the bargaining unit, and
the applicant's gross weekly wages received from other employment, reduced by the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal
taxes Which would be required to be collected, deducted or
withheld from the regular gross weekly wages received trom
other employment, provided that such weekly wages are less
than the applicant's weekly wage regularly received from the
Company at time of layoff; (B) The applicant's weekly benefit,
as defined 1n paragraph (A) above, sub-paragraph (a) through
(c), shall be adjusted and increased so as to include an amount
equal to the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal taxes or
other charges attributable to the applicant's receipt of benefits hereunder; however, the amount thereof shall be retained
by the trustee and transmitted (not less than quarterly) for
and on the applicant's behalf, to the appropriate governmental
agency (whether or not the withholding of same by the trustees
be required by law).
Allocation of Weekly Wages and Unemployment Compensation
Benefits to Partial Weeks:
Section 3.

If an employee received unemploy-

ment compensation benefits or gross wages from
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other employment for a partial calendar week, the unemployment
compensation benefits or the gross wages shall be prorated over
each day of the period for which such unemployment compensation
benefits or gross wages were paid in order to determine what
portion thereof applies to the week for which payments under
this Plan are to be made.
Withholding by the Trustee:

There shall be deducted by

the Trustee from the amount of any benefits otherwise payable
Section

4.

pursuant to this plan, any amount required to be
withheld by reason of authorized union dues

deductions and insurance premiums being normally and regularly
deducted by the Company immediately prior to layoff, provided
that the authority for such deductions has not been withdrawn
by the applicant
ARTICLE y.

Eligibility for Benefits

An employee shall be eligible for weekly supplemental
benefits from the income security Fund when he shall have made
Section 1.

application therefor in accordance with tbe procedure established hereunder and shall have met

the requirements of Section 2 of this Article.
Eligibility:

An applicant shall be eligible for a weekly

supplemental benefit only if he shall have been laid off or
Section 2.

severed from the Company's payroll subsequent
to the effective date of this plan for any

r---------------------------------------------------------------~
102

reason beyond the employee's control and
(a) if such layoff or severance
(1) was not for failure or refusal of the employee
to work
(2) was not tor reason of discharge for cause
(3) was not for military leave or for mutually agreed

upon leave of absence or for reason of retirement
(b) if with respect to such week, the applicant
(1) has registered at and reported to (on at least a
weekly basis) an employment Office maintained by
the state and the Placement Service maintained by
the Union and to accept job referrals to or to
accept and continue in employment deemed suitable
under the definitions and rulings of the state
system.
(2) has received unemployment compensation benefits
or was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits only (i) because such week is the
first week of the regular "waiting period" required
to be served under State unemployment compensation
system or (il) the applicant did not have prior to
his layoff, a sufficient period of work covered by
the State system or (iii) because of a limit, under
the State system of the period of time tor which

,,
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State unemployment compensation benefits are payable.
(3) has been employed by the Company or any other

employer for compensation or remuneration in an
amount (gross wage) less than the gross weekly
wages which the applicant received when last employed by the Company and further has presented
the necessary evidence of this fact to the Trustee
of this Plan.
ARTICLE VI.

Duration g! Benefits

(a) An eligible employee (Article V) shall be entitled to
receive a maximum number of weeks or a maximum number of hours
Section 1.

of benefits, not to exceed a total of fifty (,0)
weeks, or a total of two thousand (2,000) hours,

whichever is the lesser, within the period of fifty-two (,2)
weeks beginning with the date of layoff and limited to the expiration date of this plan, or the expiration date of said collective bargaining agreement or any extension thereof, whichever occurs earlier.
(b) An employee laid off and subsequently recalled to the
Company's payroll in accordance with the covering seniority provisions who shall again be laid orf at a subsequent date, shall
be entitled to the benefits for the maximum period described in
subsection (a) of this section, from the date last laid off and

.M
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no time or benefits received during previous periods of layoff shall be charged against the employee.
!RTICLE VII.
General:

Administratio~

of the Plan

The determination of the eligibility of any em-

ployee who applies for a weekly supplemental benefit and the
Section 1.

payment under the Plan of such benefit shall be
made in accordance with the provisions of this

Plan and administered by the Trustee of the Plan and in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
It shall be the function of the Board of ReView, established in accordance with this Article, to make the final decision as to whether or not any applicant is eligible for a weekly
supplemental benefit under the terms of the Plan and, if so,
the amount of such, benefit, provided, however, that the Trustee
shall make the initial determination in accordance with the
provisions of this Plan.
The Board of Review shall be presumed, conclusively, to
have approved any such determination by the Trustee unless the
employee who applied for such benefit shall have appealed from
the determination in the manner outlined in this Article.
Application for Benefits:

The Trustee shall have the

right to establish and, from time to time, modify reasonable
rules, regulations and procedures, which are not
Section 2.

in conflict with the principles prescribed in
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the Plan, concerning the times and places at which employees
des1ring to apply for a weekly supplemental benefit shall report in order to comply with the eligibility requirements as
set out in the Plan, and concerning the form, content and substantiation of applications for benefits.
The Trustee shall designate an office where employees laid
off may appear for the filing of applications for benefits.

The

employee laid off under this Plan, and otherwise eligible in
accordance with Article V of this Plan, shall be required to
register and file his claim for unemployment compensation benefits at his local office of the state Division of Employment
Security within five (5) days of the day of layoff or the day
following his layoff.

The employee's registration card shall

be exhibited when applying for benefits due him from the Fund
for the "waiting period u week required under the state system.
The applicant shall be required to apply for benefits on a
weekly basis during the week following the week for which he is
claiming benefits, and after he has received his unemployment
compensation check, or check from another employer.

For any

benefits claimed for the weeks laid off, subsequent to the first
week, if otherwise eligible under Article V of this Plan, the
applicant shall be required to exhibit his State unemployment
compensation check.

If the applicant was ineligible in any

week to receive a State unemployment Compensation check for any
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of the reasons stated in Article V, Section 2, b, 2, he shall,
in lieu of exhibiting a check, payment receipt or similar document, furnish satisfactory proof that he was ineligible due
solely to such reasons.
An applicant shall be required to exhibit his reporting
card or any other form of evidence furnished by the State Division of Employment Security as evidence that he has reported to
the appropriate office maintained by the State system and that
he has complied with the eligibility requirements and is eligible to receive benefits under the State system.
The Trustee may make reasonable requests, from time to
time of the applicant for some proof of the fact that the applicant has engaged in a personal search for other employment.
The applicant shall certify in writing to the Trustee for
the weeks benefits claimed:
(a) the gross weekly compensation earned from other employment during the week.s claimed
(b) such further and additional evidence and information
as may be material or relevant in order to enable a determination to be made as to eligibility for any benefits under this
Plan.
Processing Applications!

If the Trustee determines that

a week.ly supplemental benefit is payable to an eligible appliSection 3.

cant with respect to the week for which appli-
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cation is made, he shall arrange to oompute the amount and pay
to suoh eligible applicant the benefit due such person as soon
as it is reasonably possible.
If the Trustee determines that an applicant is not entitled to a weekly supplemental benefit with respect to such
week for which the applioation is made, the applicant shall be
given prompt written notice thereof.
Procedure for Appeals:

It is the purpose of the Company

and the Union to establish a procedure by which dispute as to
Section 4.

whether benefits are payable to an employee laid
off, as to the amount of such benefits, or as to

other matters regarding the interpretation of or compliance
with the terms of this Plan, may be resolved 1n an expeditious
and uniform manner.

In the absence of any mutual agreement to

the oontrary, all disputes regarding this Plan will be processed
through the following procedure:
(a) Any protest of the Trustee's decision as to whether
benefits are payable under this Plan, shall be made within ten
(10) days in writing to the Trustee.

The answer should be made

in writing by the Trustee to the applicant and to the Union
within ten (10) days.
(b) If no settlement has been effected, the applicant or
the Union may appeal in writing to the Board of Review, composed of two selected by the Union and two selected by the

r

....
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Company, setting forth the reasons for the complaint.

The

Board of Review will decide such claims within twenty (20) days
following the receipt of the written complaint and shall notify
the applicant, the Union and the Company in writing of its
decision.
(c) If any claim is not settled in accordance with the
foregoing, it may be referred within thirty (30) days to the
Union's staff representative designated by the Union and the
Company's director of Personnel.

In the event they fail to

agree within a reasonable time, either party may submit the
dispute to a Board of Arbitration by notifying the other party
in writing of the decision to arbitrate.

The Board of Arbitra-

tion shall be composed of Harold J. Gibbons, representing the
Union, Fred M. Karches, representing the Company and Vincent P.
Nangle, representing the public.
(d) The Board of Arbitration, by majority opinion, Shall
have the authority only to decide questions as to the interpretation, application or compliance with the terms of this
Plan and Shall not have authority to change the plan in any
way.

Expense of arbitration shall be borne equally by the

Union and the Company.

The Board's decision shall be final and

binding on all parties concerned.
(e) Any deciSion that is not appealed to the next step
within the specified time limit will be considered settled on
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the basis of the last decision given by the Trustee or the
Board of Review.
Cost of Administering the Plan:

The costs and expenses

incurred by the Trustee under the Plan shall be charged to the
Section

5.

ARTICLE VIII.

Fund as herein established.
Conditions
to Effectiveness -and Continuation
of Plan

Federal Income Tax Ruling:

The Plan shall not become ef-

fective and no Company contribution shall be made to the Income
Section 1.

Security Fund less and until the Company shall
have received from the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue a currently effective ruling or rulings, satisfactory
to the Company, holding that such contributions shall constitute a currently deduotible expense under the Internal Revenue
Code, as now in effect, or under any other applicable Federal
Income Tax Law.
The Plan shall not become effective and no Company oontribution shall be made to the Income Security Fund unless and
Section 2.

until the Plan shall have received a favorable
ruling by the Missouri State Division of Employ-

ment Seourity, i.e., that benefits paid hereunder shall not constitute wages to the exclusion of the payments of unemployment
compensation benefits.
The Plan shall not beoome effective and no Company contri-
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bution shall be made to the Income Security Fund less and until

the Company shall have received from the United

Section 3.

States Department of Labor a currently effective

ruling or rulings, satisfactory to the Company, holding that no
part of such contribution shall be included in the regular rate
of any employee.
Termination of Plan if Rulings are Revoked:

If any rulings

Which have been obtained as required under Sections 1, 2 and 3
above are, subsequent to the effective date of

Section 4-.

this plan, revoked or modified in such a manner

as no longer to be satisfactory to the Company, all contributions and all obligations of the Company shall cease and the
Plan shall thereupon terminate and be of no further effect, except that the Inoome Security Fund assets Shall be distributed
as provided for in Article III, Section 2 of this Plan.
If this Plan Shall be terminated, the parties agree that
Section 2, Article III of the collective bargaining agreement
of March 20, 19,3, as amended, shall be restored,
ARTICLE IX.

.!1!!cellaneous

Liability:
entire plan.

(a) The Articles of this Plan constitute the

The provisions of this Plan express, and shall be
deemed to express completely, each and every

Section 1.

obligation of the Company with respect to financ-

ing the Plan and provisions of benefits and payments thereunder.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - _..

_----

.

-----
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Without limiting the foregoing, no benefit shall be payable
except as stated in the Plan, and the Company shall not be obligated to provide for any weekly supplemental benefit or payment not provided for in this Plan, or to make any contribution
for benefits not specifically provided for in the Plan.
(b) The Trustee, the Union, and the Company, and each of
them, shall not be liable because of any act or failure to act
on the part of any of the others, and eaoh is authorized to
rely upon the oorrectness of any information furnished to him
or it by an authorized representative of the others.
(0)

The Trustee shall be direoted to hold or to invest the

assets of the Income Security only in cash, or in other short
term government securities as provided for in Article III which
may be readily liquidated, irrespective of the rate of return,
or absence of return, and without any limit upon the amount
that may be invested.
No vester interest:

Except as provided in this Plan, no

employee shall have any right, title or interest in or to any
Section 2.

of the assets of the Income Security Fund or in
or to any accrued or deferred Company contribu-

tions.
No benefits shall be subject in any way to alienation,
sale, transfer, aSSignment, pledge, attaohment, garnishment, or
enoumbrance of any kind.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _...
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ARTICLE X.

~~endment

and Termination

Modification of Plan:

(a) So long as the labor agreement

ooncerning this Plan shall remain in effect, the Plan shall not
Section 1.

be amended, modified, suspended or terminated,
except as may be provided or permissible under

the terms of the Plan or the collective bargaining agreement ot
March 20, 1953, as amended.
Except as herein specifically amended, the said collective
bargaining agreement of March 20, 1953, as amended by the amendSeotion 2.

ing agreement of June 27, 1956, shall be continued in full force and effect for its full

term, that is to say, to and including February 28. 1958.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their
hands this 30th day of November, 1956
WAREHOUSE & DISTRIB:JTION

WORKERS UNION

RICE-STIX, INC.

Local 688, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
A.F. of L. C.I.O.

/s/ F. M. Karohes

/s/ Edward C. Brown

/s/ Joseph R. Wolf
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November 29, 19,6'
Local 688 Warehouse and
DistributIon Workers' Union
1127 Pine Street
St, Louis 1, Missouri
Gentlemen:
With reference to the amending agreement entered into by
the Union and the Company on November 30, 1956, establishing
the Income Security Plan, the parties further agree that:
1.

Payments required of the Company under Article IX

(Labor Health Institute) and Article XIV (Unity Welfare Associat~n)

of the collective bargaining agreement of March 20, 1953,

shall continue to be made as provided in said articles for those
employees eligible for benefits under the Income Security Plan.
Such payments to be computed on the basis of the gross pay received at time of layoff.
No payments shall be due such employees if their current employer is oovered under the Teamsters' Labor Health Institute and Unity Welfare provisions.
2.

No employee, otherwise eligible to receive benefits

under the Inoome Security Plan, shall be disqualified for such
benefits if the employee were to be declared ineligible for
said unemployment compensation benefits for reason of refusal
to accept employment at a company or strike or where a picket
line has been established.

3. Employees who are otherwise eligible to receive

lllt-

I

benefits under the Income Security Plan, who are idled because
of a strike or a picket line established at the company at
which they are employed, shall have the "insurance" period, as
defined in Article IV, Section 1, of the Income Security Plan,
extended by the time lost because of such strike or picket line
provided however, that the employee shall make application for
such extension, in writing, not later than five (5) days following date of such idleness.
Very truly yours,
RICE-STIX, INC.
/s/ F. M. Karehes
Accepted:
WAREHOUSE & DISTRIBUTION
WORKERS' UNION
Local 6dd, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
A.F. of L. - C.I.O.
/s/ Edward C, Brown

APPENDIX V
GENERAL STATEMENT OF COSTS
Following are enumerated the expenditures for the operation of the Rice-Stix SUB program for a sixty-one week period
oommending Monday, Deoember 31, 1956 and ending Friday, February 28, 1958.
CASH PAYMENTS FOR ACTUAL WEEKLY BENEFITS,
UNITY WELFARE PAYMENTS AND
LABOR HEALTH INSTITJTE PAYMENTS
A.

Benefits ......•........•........ $238,092.1;

B.

Unity Welfare and Labor Health
Inst1tute Payments ..............
(Total l~ of gross weekly wages
pa1d before layoff - January and
February 1958 est1mated)

77.391. 38 $315, .... 83.;3

ESTIMATED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
A.

Salaries
Payroll (approximately two days
per week; rate $1. 99 per hour) .. ,$

B.

1,9....2.24

Personnel <.. .•••••..•••••.•••..•

10,300.00

Clerioal (approximately It dars
per week; rate $1.90 per hour) _.

1,390.80

Misoellaneous Operating Costs
1.

Employment Agency Fees
$
(Charged Rice-Stix for plaoement of employees eligible
for SUB)
>

•••••
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1,531.72

13,633

0 ....

r
$

Brought forward
2.
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1,53 1 .72 $329,116.57

Printing (Application Blanks,
Payroll Authorization Forma,
Form Letters, etc.) ........ .
Mailing and Postage

333.37
1,950.66

85.57

... *' . . . . . '" "

$33 1 ,067.23
STATISTICS
Total number of employees eligible
for benef its .. '......, .. '... . ... , .. '.,....

318

Average age of employees eligible ............. ,....

45

Average number of full benefits paid per week
Total number of benefit claims filed in
61 wee k per iod ....... ., .... "

S

•

II

.....

"

......

"

"

•••

"

Average number of applications for benefits
tiled per week ...

It

•

\!I'

..........

.,

..

.-

......

"

..

"

....

....

~

"

••

•

"

of

9,957
163

Average cost of benefits paid per week ............. $3,903.1,
Average benefit paid per application per week ......

$23 95

Average total benefit paid per employee " ...... ' .. .
Average total fringe benefit (TlWA & LHI)
paid per employee ............. ' .............. .

$243.37

Average total benefit paid per employee ........... .

$992,,09

Maximum payment to an individual employee ....

_,0 _.0

$2,122.98

,
APPENDIX VI
QUESTIONNAIRE
Name
1.

If employed after lay-off t which of the three employment
services gave you the leaa?

a.

b.
c.
d.

State Employment Service
Union Employment Service
Company Employment Service
Through your own efforts

2.

Do you feel that you were referred to a job for which you
were unsuited. Why?

3.

Were you ever disqualified or held ineligible for benefits
under tne SUB Plan? It yes, for what reason?

4.

Why do you think the Company sold out?

,.

How much time elapsed after lay-otf before you obtained
another permanent job?

6.

What is your personal opinion of the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan and how it was administered?

7. Would you prefer a severance pay plan to a Supplemental
Unemployment Benefits Plan?

8.

Remarks you may wish to add:
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